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Over the last ﬁfteen years the trade negotiations agenda has
come to include more and more non-border issues, and on several
occasions the ﬁrst step has been to obtain a consensus between the
involved parties as to its contents and scope.  This broadening of the
trade agenda has pushed political and co-operation themes towards
the periphery, from where good intentions can be shown off without
any commitment towards enforcement or results. 
The events of 11 September 2001 gave rise to a profound change
in the rules of the power exercise in the international sphere.  One
of the most marked effects of this change has been the increased





commercial logic that used to dominate relations between states
and private actors in the 1990s. Furthermore, the orientation and
priorities of the trade policy of the main political, military and eco-
nomic players on the world level are increasingly tending towards
not only economic objectives but also those of a political-strategic
nature. 
The trade negotiations now underway express the more than har-
monious overlap of these two processes, combining as they do the
broad economic agenda typical of the 1990s, still expanding, with
considerations of a political nature.  For both the European Union
and Mercosur, regional blocs identiﬁed with the logic of the “soft
power” that was typical of the 1990s, this new world poses signiﬁ-
cant challenges, and the bi-regional negotiations now being held are
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an excellent opportunity for fostering innovations in the ﬁeld of
international relations. 
Moreover, the political and co-operative dimension of the bi-
regional agreement provides an institutional space for facing up to
some of these challenges.  In order for this to happen, the key issue
is the capacity of the parties involved to “focus” the agenda, that is,
to choose priorities that effectively add content to the agreement as
a whole, whether through their speciﬁc contribution to the relation-
ship between the parties or to the interaction between this dimen-
sion of the negotiations and the commercial dimension of the
agreement, or through their “systemic” contribution to the emer-
gence of a world order not monopolized by the logic of “hard
power”.
The chapters in this volume discuss relevant themes in the area
of the so-called “political and cooperative dimension” of the bi-




 and Mercosur. They should be
seen as part of an effort of reﬂection meant to “focus” –in the mean-
ing given above to this word– the agenda of this dimension of the
negotiations. 
The text by Sayantan Ghosal and Marcus Miller –
 
Managing
Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets: New Developments in
review
 
– ﬁts into the discussion on the emergence in the developed
countries of paradigms for dealing with the “development theme.”
On the level of international relations, this theme involves the ﬁnan-
cial (debts, loans from multilateral organisations, etc.), trade and
development aid dimensions, whereas on the national level, for the
developing countries, it involves the economic policies practised.
Ghosal and Miller synthesise the recent debate on re-structuring




countries by discussing alternative































 itself and apparently rejected by a vocal coa-
lition of both developed and developing countries. 
The authors’ basic reference for the purpose of comparison is the




, the maintenance of which is not implau-
sible, but is nonetheless surrounded by risks and uncertainties.  In a
context where problems of co-ordination among creditors are
mixed with high incentives for debtors to resort to international
ﬁnancial markets, the key issue of Ghosal and Miller’s text seems to
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be how to create incentives for institutional innovation in an area




There is in fact a parallel between this situation and the dilem-
mas faced in trade negotiations, although in the ﬁnancial arena the
debates and negotiations are at a far less advanced stage than in the
commercial arena.  Indeed, as pointed out by Jérôme Sgard (the





) the relevance of local regulations and institutions to the stabil-




) the difﬁculty in making
national ﬁnancial regulations harmonious and convergent. This
actualises the dilemma between on the one hand a game governed
by unilateral actions performed by public and private actors –that
is, one based on unilateralism– and on the other hand a game driven
by rules agreed upon multilaterally. 
Nonetheless, regulating ﬁnancial markets on the international
level involves two inter-related elements that have a low rate of con-
sensus among public and private players. Te ﬁrst is the question of
whether or not to regulate, and if so, who should do it, national
states or international institutions?  The second question is the del-
icate issue of national sovereignty. In the speciﬁc ﬁeld of re-struc-





an intermediate solution to these two problems. The idea of regula-




s proper– yet the basis for the enforcement









 in turn inserts to a large extent the idea of supra-
nationality into the concept of a dispute-settling mechanism not far





Certain elements of this debate are not without parallels in the







/Mercosur Relations and Reviving Multi-
lateralism.  
 
Indeed, as mentioned by Alfredo G.A. Valladão (dis-
cussant of the chapter submitted by Vasconcellos), here too the
theme of crisis-administration is present, just as it is in the text writ-
ten by Ghosal and Miller.  In the case of the discussions on interna-
tional politics and security, there are today several models of crisis
administration and “regime change”, all of which to a greater or
lesser extent suffer from a crisis of legitimacy. 





the unilateral deﬁnition of the legitimate use of force, which has
attracted few supporters, even from among traditional allies of the
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country.  Then there is the model of the traditional multilateral sys-




 institutions and enforcement mechanisms, all very
vigorous in terms of respect for State sovereignties and for that very
reason more and more contested.  And ﬁnally there is the European




power” and a new type of multilat-
eralism, whose credibility is under threat from the poor effective-






Two world-order scenarios seem to serve as a reference for
Vasconcellos’ text. The ﬁrst is a world order strongly supported by
military power –and by the “politics of power”– with two variants,
one unipolar and the other multipolar.  The second is a system
based on universally accepted rules and norms: the “new multilat-
eralism.”  This is “new” because this model of world system organ-
isation that began to emerge in the 1990s, characterised by the
relevance of the regionalism phenomenon, and by the fact that it is
indissolubly linked to the emergence of a global public opinion and
the protection of individual rights, above and beyond the estab-










 is the chief bearer of this new multilateralism
project, it ﬁnds it difﬁcult to assert this identity on the international




power” resources around a
coherent policy.  These difﬁculties can be seen not only in the
implementation of ambitious initiatives to reset the relations of the
European Union with developing countries –such as the so-called
“Barcelona process” with non-European Mediterranean countries–




, which have deteriorated in the last









’s capacity to act internation-
ally as the principal pivot of the proposals for a new multilateral-
ism, it becomes more possible that one of the variants of the
alternative scenario traced out for world order could emerge,
namely, the one based on “hard power”. Besides this, and at the
same time parallel to these difﬁculties, international themes –espe-
cially when involving relations with relevant political and eco-




– tend increasingly to produce
divergences among the Union’s Member States.  Such divergences





, both of which positions contribute towards the emergence of
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a non-multilateralist scenario (unipolar in the ﬁrst case, multipolar
in the second).









should opt for a “third way” between automatic alignment and the
attitude of confrontation.  He suggests a “critical engagement”, a
more appropriate stance for orienting the permanent and multi-fac-
eted negotiations that characterise bilateral relations (and which
will continue to do so in the next few years).  A consensus on this








 would increase signiﬁ-
cantly. 




 the ambition of an international
order ruled by universal norms and painstakingly seeks to assert













 playing a vital role in their








  oscillate between automatic alignment and, if not actual




foreign policy, the politico-military problems of Colombia and




 trade negotiations dominate the debate on




.  In the present cir-
cumstances, antipathy has effectively replaced automatic align-
ment, but the frequent meetings between Presidents Bush and Lula
suggest that there is room for, and reciprocal interest in, setting up
channels of communication to deal with a complex and constantly
changing agenda.









void of content and concrete proposals.  Ever




 have constituted a key




 relations inﬂuence intra-bloc rela-
tions on both sides, and bi-regional relations, and they also, espe-









systemic impacts that go beyond these two types of relations.  At
various stages in the process of consolidating an international iden-
tity, and with the availability of likewise highly diverse political




 face some sim-
ilar challenges while sharing the basic elements of what should be
a world order. Having said that, the adhesion of the Mercosur
 
Polit_04Intro  Page 19  Jeudi, 18. septembre 2003  8:20 08 
20
Member States to a multilateralism that is less respectful of sover-
eignties is –to say the least– somewhat conditioned.





  and Mercosur, Vasconcellos lists the main items of an
agenda of political dialogue and co-operation on the bi-regional
level.  One of the pre-conditions for the implementation of this
agenda is obviously that Mercosur must succeed in overcoming its
present crisis and in the short run become consolidated as a customs









Advances in intra-Mercosur co-ordination and reﬁnement of
sub-regional rules also appear as pre-conditions for the proper
implementation of an agenda linking trade and co-operation in the














since some of the co-operation projects listed by the author
have a relevant regional dimension that requires Mercosur to show
a higher degree of cohesion and regulatory convergence in order to





discusses the role of co-operation in trade agree-
ments, attributing to it the function of minimising the potential
effects –when the agreements are viewed as public goods– of the
fact that trade negotiations tend to be dominated by agents who are
identiﬁed as being economically directly involved in the process.
This does not imply ignoring that the very deﬁnition of the themes
making up the co-operation agenda of a trade agreement also trans-
lates, on a speciﬁc level, the economic policy of the negotiation,
which generally is more clearly identiﬁable in the commercial com-
ponent of the negotiations. 
Five priority areas of co-operation are identiﬁed:
–  agriculture and phytosanitary measures, an area that directly





With the rise of the level of pre-requisites needed for admission of
farming products to the European market, a tendency recently con-





potential for trade friction in this area is bound to grow;
–  investments and related measures, where both blocs share a




 treats the theme; this conver-
gence could be explored to the beneﬁt of the results of the Doha
Round; 
 
Polit_04Intro  Page 20  Jeudi, 18. septembre 2003  8:20 08 
21
–  telecommunications and information technology, where co-
operation could involve chieﬂy standards of networks for cellular
telephony and digital television, these being areas where Mercosur
is still in the phase of implementation or even of deﬁning standards; 
–  culture and property rights, where the main proposals for co-
operation refer primordially to a common deﬁnition of the “cultural
enterprise” to which both blocs would grant speciﬁc privileges, and
secondly to the improvement in both regions of channels of distri-
bution and diffusion of audiovisual products manufactured in the
two blocs; and
–  dispute-settlement, where a system of previous consultation






Another relevant zone of potential co-operation is deﬁned by the
agenda of structural adjustment, where the European Union enjoys
wide experience in drawing up and implementing policies.  As a
matter of fact, these themes are tending to gain relevance on Mer-





Union negotiations.  Here again appears the problem of Mercosur’s
internal insufﬁciencies and difﬁculties, which hinder the carrying
out of any project compatible with the new challenges already
faced by the bloc. 
The truth is that one of the main and most troubling conclusions
drawn by the three texts presented here –and in a general sense by
the discussions held in this cluster–  has to do with the problems
faced by Mercosur in order to respond adequately even to an
agenda of negotiations typical of the 1990s.  And this is in an inter-
national context where associations between countries and blocs
have to consider, in addition to the themes on that agenda, new
questions that are mostly linked to the politics, security and admin-
istration of different types of crises. 
Accordingly, what Mercosur needs to do, besides concluding its
customs union –a complex task in itself– is to add these new ques-
tions to its other concerns.  In order to associate promoting a new
multilateralism with an international identity, Mercosur must consol-




driven integration, re-shape relations
between what is regional and what is national in this process, and
keep farther and farther away from “sovereignist” multilateralism.
Another important conclusion drawn by these studies involves
the close inter-relationship between the intra-bloc, inter-bloc and
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systemic dimensions that characterise principally the agenda on
politics and security and themes related to international ﬁnances.
The chapter written by Vasconcellos shows this sort of inter-rela-
tionship in the analysis of the dilemmas in consolidating a common
foreign policy for the European Union as a “three-level game” that





, and Europe’s relations with its systemic proposal of regulat-
ing the international system: the new multilateralism.  Another
example of the intensity of this inter-relationship (in this case
involving essentially intra- and extra-bloc dynamics) is provided by
Mercosur, where the fragility of the process of integration compro-
mises the capacity of the bloc to negotiate and beneﬁt from a co-
operation agenda in areas that are relevant to the sub-regional
project, as well as seriously jeopardising the possibility that this
project will contribute towards a re-deﬁnition of the international













in the post-9/11 International Environment
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Any attempt at assessing the potential and the shortcomings of




action in confronting the Iraq crisis would inevitably lead to the
conclusion that there is no such thing.  This foregone conclusion
which is shared by many analysts and commentators is in my view




 to act in
a cohesive and united manner in the face of any major crisis, espe-
cially in those cases when its interests do not coincide, but rather
conﬂict, with those of the United States.  This, it is also argued
here, will increasingly be the case, at least when crises occur out-
side the boundaries of the European continent.   The Iraq crisis




 foreign policy, in those areas where it is operative, such as
foreign trade and development aid, is that of a civil power, based on
a model of development and social cohesion which has had an
unequalled impact worldwide; some observers have even described
it as a global Scandinavia.  Its most innovative and attractive char-
acteristic has been the way in which it has enabled Europe to over-
come nationalism for, as Raymond Aron has argued, the extreme
nationalism of the Second World War rendered all forms of nation-
alism illegitimate.  It paved the way for Franco-German reconcilia-
tion and for the integration of the old Europe, on the basis of
multilateral rules and norms and an awareness of common interests.
There can be no doubt that this experience has had a global inﬂu-
ence.  The growth in awareness of the need to protect human rights
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that has accompanied economic and technological globalisation,
together with the requirement for environmental protection and
compliance with multilateral principles of international behaviour,
has been at the root of the popularity of the European model.  The
attractiveness of this model, together with its sheer economic size,
has given Europe a great deal of “soft power”, in terms of Joseph
Nye’s four elements of power: economic, national cohesion, mili-
tary, universalistic culture (Nye, 1990; 2002).  Yet Europe still lacks
weight in the international arena.   Two of Nye’s dimensions of









act decisively in dealing with crucial international problems.
Mercosur is a regional grouping roughly inspired by the Euro-





are, and will probably continue to be lacking, other
than within the limited conﬁnes of commerce, it has exerted a nota-




  its neighbours through the
“power of example”.   As it develops further its inherent “soft
power” dimension, notably in conﬂict and crisis prevention, Merco-




, and their ability to act
together in the international sphere will concomitantly increase.
 






 acts in the international sphere as an eminently civilian
power through a long-term strategy of inclusion which relies on the
full panoply of instruments of soft power.  In other words, where
traditional power politics would seek to pre-empt, civil-power
politics seeks to prevent.  These are two diverging, and at times





-style inclusion and prevention –of conﬂict and crisis– are
intended to strengthen the impetus for political reform, develop-
ment and economic integration and cohesion within societies, on





 relies on the virtues of soft power, including where post-
conﬂict reconstruction is concerned.
Success so far in putting to full use soft power instruments outside
the boundaries of Europe, when measured against the results




 could ever hope to play a leading role in shaping the international
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order by soft power alone.  Promoting peace and democratisation
through the inclusive method has proved to be perfectly suited only





was real and political conditionality was thus fully brought to bear.
 Both the Copenhagen criteria and the Stability Pact, where certain
conditions regarding respect for human and minority rights are set
out, are exemplary.  In other words, the promised reward was far
greater than the penalties imposed.  Real membership prospects for
Turkey have clearly accelerated the pace of democratic reform, and
are contributing to democratising political forces, including those of





As we go beyond the European continent, however, there are not
many results to show for policies which by and large have proved to
be unco-ordinated at best, and are in several cases inconsistent.  A


















 to expand the area of peace and stabil-
ity beyond its boundaries to the south, to include North Africa and




 to a vast region –or regions– where
potential or current instability is driven by serious social, economic




 would need to act on
the correct interplay between economic integration and pressing for
social and political reform, in a similar fashion to what happened in
Europe itself.




 are a consequence of the lack





action: the economic and the political impetus sometimes conﬂict.
While the Union has been laying the foundations of a free trade area
within the region by establishing individual association agreements
providing for free trade –with the notable exception of agriculture–
with the countries of the region, there is much slower progress in





 policy has been ineffectual at best in promoting any
 
1. The signatories of the Barcelona Declaration (November 1995) which has
established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are the members of the Euro-
pean Union plus Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta,
Morocco, the Palestine Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.  Cyprus and Malta









 candidate, although contrary to its expectations the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council, in December 2002, failed to set a starting date for membership
negotiations.
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change in the status quo, fearful perhaps of a repetition on a much
wider scale of the Algerian case and Islamist forces coming to power
through elections.  Perhaps the Turkish example, and the sizeable
gains of the Justice and Development party in the November 2002
elections in Morocco, will contribute to allaying fears of a resur-
gence of radical Islamist forces coming to power through democratic




 institutions to become more
involved in effectively confronting the issue of political reform in the
south, and actively addressing the related issue of human rights.
European institutions and notably the European Council have
consistently abstained from explicitly condemning human rights
violations in the southern Mediterranean partner countries.  The
equally consistent exception is the European Parliament, but in the
absence of other than declaratory policy instruments, its solitary
voice has little resonance even within Europe itself.  The European
Commission, it should be noted, supports a human rights network.




s in the south should
be listed as a positive outcome, it must be admitted that the impact




 has still to be felt.
In the light of the impact of the current international crisis on


















 and its Member States
ﬁnd themselves in a position where they are compelled to become
proactive in the promotion of democratic transition and respect for
human rights under the strain of events and under what will increas-
ingly become the pressure of their own publics.  European public
opinion is bound to become less tolerant of double standards.
Political transition should therefore be encouraged as a process,
and change regarded as incremental and not abrupt or imposed




institutions and pillars, and the unreserved backing of the Member
States.  In light of the above, it becomes evident that policy towards
the Mediterranean basin must also be designed taking into account




 foreign policy, namely the coherent
interplay of Community institutions, the Council and the Member
States.
Another area that powerfully illustrates the shortcomings of the




 is Latin America, and Mercosur in
particular.  Consistency would in this case imply –as opposed to the
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outward projection of internally held values or norms– a sort of




 should let its own ambi-
tion in terms of the international order override purely domestic





bringing about an international order based on regionalism, then the
Europeans must be able to overcome internal differences related to
agricultural policy reform standing in the way of an inter-regional





 Member States which are more reluctant to
accept an overhaul of the Common Agricultural Policy are among
the most vocal in pleading (and pledging) to further strengthen rela-
tions with Latin America.
Post-conﬂict reconstruction and nation-building require broadly
the same kinds of policy instruments as conﬂict and crisis preven-




  is deemed thoroughly, and by some uniquely,




  for example,




 should abandon any attempt at transcending its
civil power role, which it would be well advised to perform as a




 military power: 
 




 military power, or hankering after it,
Europe would do better to invest its political and budgetary capital in
a distinctive complement to it.  European civilian power, if wielded
shrewdly and more coherently, could be an effective and credible
instrument of modern European statecraft, not just to compel compli-
ance by smaller countries but perhaps even to induce greater Ameri-
can understanding.   Europe might get its way more often –and
without a bigger army (Moravcsik, 2003).
 





 to deal mainly with soft security and to use budget-
ary and political persuasion to make smaller countries fall into line,
while hard security would be the sole preserve of the United States.
More importantly, it would require complete convergence between
Europe and the United States, and the acceptance of a surrogate
role under any circumstances.   Should differences arise, these









 parliaments and govern-










1. The author, a professor of government, heads the European Union pro-
gramme at Harvard University.
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Civil-Power Constraints to Policy Options
 
The conﬂict in the Balkans during the 1990s has powerfully
made the case for the limitations and constraints to which a civil
power approach inevitably leads, even when the continental process
of inclusion is concerned.  It was obvious from the early stages of
the conﬂict that any massive amount of aid (which was not forth-




in the distant future, as Jacques Delors pointed out at the time, or
any amount of economic clout exercised negatively through sanc-
tions, was powerless to prevent and even less so resolve the
conﬂicts that successively broke out in the region.  A “toothless”
civilian power was in no position to act decisively in order to pre-
vent conﬂict and war in the Balkans.  There was a military element
to either the prevention or the resolution of these crises and





 soft power, in spite of a clear convergence of views and inter-
ests with the United States, tragically proved absolutely
ineffectual.  Also, the ﬁrst serious post-Cold War crisis on its very




 unprepared, and unequipped with the appro-
priate mechanisms for the formulation of a common policy





deeply divided over the Balkans crisis, and old, seemingly long-for-
gotten, reﬂections of different geopolitical cultures, which the pro-
cess of European construction itself would seem to have long
delegitimised, soon re-emerged.  These were not resolved but sim-
ply glossed over by the incomplete reforms subscribed to in the
Treaty of Amsterdam and the half-hearted compromise contained





back into “re-nationalisation” in the post-Cold War environment
were not decisively dispelled.
On the eve of the war on Iraq, the huge “deﬁcit of unity” on for-




Member States throws into question whether a European foreign
security and defence policy is still a viable option.  Leaving aside
the issue of credibility, it remains an open question whether it will




 to act as a cohe-
sive body in the international arena.




 remains the same after the Iraq crisis,
though it is perhaps more difﬁcult to answer: whether and how it
will be able to build itself into a credible and effective player on the
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world scene.  The Convention on the Future of Europe has the dif-
ﬁcult but crucial task of providing an answer.  In order to do so, a














; how to ensure overall
coherence between the various components of external action; the

















 is a federation in reverse, in the sense of transferring to
the centre those responsibilities that are normally the prerogatives
of states in ordinary federal systems, and leaving to Member States
those responsibilities –such as foreign policy, defence policy and
taxation– that are usually the federal government’s province.
The best way to correct this imperfection is not to try to emulate
the United States and build a European super-state.   Rather, as
Jacques Delors, and especially Joschka Fischer in his Humboldt




 should become a confedera-
tion of states which will continue to share responsibility for a sig-




  level, confederate
democracy being guaranteed through the Council and the Senate.
There is no other way of ensuring dual legitimacy, conferred both
by the citizens and the states.  A federation of democratic states is a
supranational body built on norms and rules that delegitimise
power politics among member states.
It is not because of any in-built weakness, as is suggested by





 favours a multilateral approach, but rather, as Kagan
also recognises, because it is a construction based on supranational




 cannot act as a player in inter-
national politics along different lines from those that regulate rela-
tions among its Member States without betraying the expectations
of its own citizens and undermining coherence with the values




 ediﬁce.  Interests and




’s view of the world order is





 will be unable to carve a role for itself as a major world




 is not interested in an international multipolar
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order based on an unstable balance of power system, and even less
on a bipolar system in which it would confront the United States on





seek to become a distinctive pillar of the international system,
clearly identiﬁable as such.
The 2003 crisis in Iraq brings to the fore all the ambiguities of
the ongoing debate pitching the notion of Europe as a “traditional
power” against that of Europe as a “space”.  The British, who tra-
ditionally have been the main promoters of the latter idea, have
been led into a national reﬂex of automatic alignment with the
United States by the most pro-European Prime Minister they have




 was seen as having no role at all
in the run-up to the crisis and the war, and the only role Britain
sees for it is a humanitarian and post-conﬂict rehabilitation one
alongside the United Nations.  The French, who have been the tra-
ditional supporters of the notion of “Europe as a power”, were
those who more clearly reﬂected the common European interest in
the ﬁrst phase of the crisis up to the time when the Security Coun-
cil passed resolution 1441, having stood for mutilateralism in line




 itself, although they did so from a
“national” perspective, with no serious attempt at rallying the
Union behind them.
It is arguable that, not least because it will not be able to bridge




’s role as a major world player is condi-
tional upon its ability to shape a world order based on a “new mul-
tilateralism” that was indeed emerging in the post-bipolar
international system in the 1990s and that is marked by three char-
acteristics.
 
First by the sense that the international community and the United
Nations in particular are responsible for the protection of the rights
of individuals, above and beyond sovereign boundaries.  It is a sover-
eignty altering multilateralism.  Second, by regionalism, a phenome-
non that has become a structural feature of the international system
as a whole.  And third, by the emergence of a global public opinion,
a “second wave” of globalisation, which expresses the desire of civil
society to inﬂuence or participate in global decision-making, and
like the globalisation of trade, ﬁnances and services, has pushed the
need for global multilateral governance forward.  This is a sover-
eignty-altering multilateralism, which changes the position of the
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It could be argued that the right of intervention in sovereign









istration is promoting by defending a doctrine of pre-emption.  Pre-
emption is not synonymous with humanitarian intervention, how-
ever.  The former is typical of power politics, whilst the latter is a
fundamental concept in the development of a multilateral order
based on principles and norms that make the rights of citizens the
business of the global community.  Both are the fruits of the same
situation: the dominance of democratic powers in the post-Cold
War era.  However, they represent radically different views of how
that power should be used.  Unless they operate according to uni-
versally accepted rules, democratic powers will come to be seen as
a coalition of “the West against the rest” inspired by a “clash of
civilisations” strategy.




 upholds in the international arena is





it currently stands.  The Convention has reached consensus towards
an expansion of their formulation into the following wording: 
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by,
and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement:
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,
equality and solidarity, and for international law in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter.  The Union shall seek to
develop relations and build partnerships with countries, and regional
or global organisations, which share these values.  It shall promote
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the
framework of the United Nations (Draft European Constitution, Title








 will be severely
undermined if full conformity by all Member States cannot be




 states in Article 19 that Member States “which
are permanent members of the Security Council will, in execution
of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the inter-
ests of the Union”, and Article 13 requires Member States “to safe-










.  Both documents can be found at www.european-convention.eu.int.  
 






 has nonetheless taken part in a military operation in Iraq




 Security Council refused to





of a resolution co-sponsored with Spain and the United States.

























erless to create a consensus leading to other than a declaratory com-
mitment to the central role of the United Nations in the resolution




  constitutional treaty must therefore establish patterns of
accountability so that the European Court of Justice can act when-
ever the Union, or its Member States, violates its own principles.
This means that the Union’s vision of the world, which opposes
power politics and encourages multilateral international law, should
be enshrined in the constitutional treaty.
It is doubtful, however, that the reform of the treaty will succeed
in this regard since it is highly unlikely that states can be made to
accept such a clear limitation to their freedom of individual action,
which goes much further than the statement, however strongly





crisis has powerfully highlighted, however, the staunch support for
“multilateral solutions” among European public opinions which
suggests that it would back enshrining the set of principles govern-




 in the treaty, thereby giving
them binding force.  Should this be the case, the implications in
terms of coherent and effective EU action in international security
issues would be far-reaching.  As noted above, and as the Iraq crisis
once again highlights, it is obvious that the EU as such, like any
group of states, can not develop a foreign policy which is not based
on the set of principles which informs interaction between its mem-
ber states, such as human rights and multilateralism.
1. In Article I-13, Para. 2, the draft Constitution does require Member States to
bring their foreign and security policies in line with those of the EU: “Member Sta-
tes shall actively and unreservedly support the Union’s common foreign and secu-
rity policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the
acts adopted by the Union in this area.  They shall refrain from action contrary to
the Union’s interests or likely to impair its effectiveness”.
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There is no historical precedent as to whether an effective inter-
national actor can emerge on the basis of a rejection of power poli-
tics, and it is questionable that the EU could indeed become the ﬁrst
to do so.  Many analysts contend that this is unlikely, especially at
a time when the international order is decisively shaped by a domi-
neering world power which views the UN as an optional extra.
Redeﬁning the Relationship with the United States
No lasting and stable world order is even remotely possible with-
out the commitment of the United States.  However, completing the
multilateral order which seemed to be setting itself in place under
the impetus of two American presidents as the Cold War drew to a
close would seem beyond reach unless there is a signiﬁcant change
in the course set by the current US Administration.  It is unquestion-
able that the decision to invade Iraq was taken unilaterally.  But
then, when the Bush Administration decided on 12 September 2002
to play the UN card and seek Security Council backing for that inva-
sion, is it inconceivable to assume that the end result would not
have been the same, had the two permanent (UK, France) and two
rotating (Germany, Spain) EU  Members States in the Security
Council taken a common stance? It seems safe to assume that their
combined strength, backed by the full EU membership, would at
least have had a signiﬁcant chance of inﬂuencing the US position.
Clearly, the reverse argument has been proven.   It is doubtful
indeed whether the United States would have been in a position to
intervene in Iraq without the participation or the backing of any EU
member.  Obviously, the rift between EU members is much less
about Iraq than about the individual and collective relationship with
the United States.  
“Critical engagement” –a sort of “third way” between unques-
tioning alignment and useless head-on opposition– seems to be the
best option to govern EU-US relations, because no other would have
a chance of winning full backing from the EU Member States.  This
would presuppose of course that automatic alignment would not
necessarily be the rule, and that the EU would be in a position to
say “No” to the United States, albeit under exceptional circum-
stances, without either breaking apart or risking standing accused
of seeking confrontation.   Whatever the choice, critical engage-
ment or even opposition is condemned to failure if it lacks the
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foundations of a solid European convergence that allows the EU to
function as a bloc.
During the Bush (senior) and Clinton Administrations, a signiﬁ-
cant convergence with Europe was forged regarding the creation of
a multilateral international order, which smoothed over and attenu-
ated differences.  This consensus paved the way for the vast coali-
tion that waged the Gulf War in 1991.  The shift in US policy, the
break away from a multilateral project, has upset the transatlantic
and the European consensus, all the more so because inﬂuential
members of the current US Administration are not exactly enthusi-
astic supporters, to put it mildly, of European unity.  For the neo-
conservatives, Europe is essentially a collection of states that
should be bound primarily by solidarity with the United States and
not among themselves (Hassner and Vaisee, 2003: 153).  It is there-
fore crucial to move European policy away from an amalgamating
“Atlanticism” and towards a Euro-American partnership that would
also constitute an important factor in European integration.
United in Action
In order to guarantee overall policy coherence and unity in EU
action in the wider international arena, debate within the European
Convention has concentrated on six major reform proposals: 1
(i) Qualiﬁed majority voting in a common foreign and security
policy (CFSP), but not a European security and defence policy
(ESDP);
(ii) Creating the post of EU Foreign Minster with the combined
functions of the current High Representative and the Commis-
sioner in charge of External Relations;
(iii)Replacing rotating member states’ presidencies of the EU with
a President of the European Union;
(iv) Paving the way for a wider use of the “reinforced co-operation”
mechanism, including in defence;
(v) Reforming external representation through the single represen-
tation of the Eurogroup in the major ﬁnancial institutions;
(vi) Creating a EU diplomatic corps.
1. The proposals put forward by the European Convention, including the Draft
Constitution, will subsequently be discussed by Member States in the intergovern-
mental conference due to start in the late summer of 2003.
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The most controversial is the Franco-German proposal to end
rotating presidencies, strongly opposed by the smaller states which
see it as an attempt to diminish their role; so far it is backed only by
Spain, Italy and Britain, and less enthusiastically by Poland.  Here
lies the main objection to a president of the Union.  The smaller
states fear they will in effect lose power, and some are also con-
cerned that their special ties with various regions of the world, and
the particular focus they bring to EU foreign policy during rotating
presidencies, will thus be lost.  It is unlikely that majority voting
will become the general rule rather than the exception in CFSP,
owing to renewed British opposition.  Perhaps the best way of com-
bining multiple priorities and sustained focus together with effec-
tiveness has yet to be found as far as EU foreign policy is concerned.
The EU has set a unique precedent in what concerns governance,
having devised a multi-layered system of governance which is
unique.  At the heart of this system lies the wide variety of actors
which are involved when it comes to areas such as crisis prevention
or, at the other end of the spectrum, economic policy (an area where
powers of initiative are the exclusive preserve of the European
Commission): the Council, the Commission, Member States,
regions, NGOs.  To make matters more complex, the system is built
on a tripod or three pillars.  It is likely that the current reform pro-
cess will result in a two pillar-system being adopted, one dealing
with the Community, CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and
another one with defence.
Co-ordinating such a complex system may hinder the EU’s
capacity for action, but at the same time it contributes to its distinc-
tiveness as an international player, better adapted to the interdepen-
dent world in which we live.  These inherent features make the
European Union ideally suited for long-term crisis-prevention
through a comprehensive approach to regions or groupings aiming
to address political, social and economic as well as security aspects
in a balanced and integrated way.  The best example of such an
approach so far, in spite of the many shortcomings and failures to
translate it into a coherent set of policy options, remains the Barce-
lona Process.
Attempts at formulating a European security and defence policy
are mainly the result of European impotence and American absence
in the initial stages of war in the Balkans.  Under the impulse of the
Franco-British statement issued at the St.  Malo summit in Decem-
ber 1998, ESDP ofﬁcially came into being at the December 1999
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European Council in Helsinki.  A number of decisions leading to
the creation of a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force (which has still
to be declared fully operational) and a 5,000 strong international
police force1 were subsequently taken in Feira (June 2000) and
Marseilles (November 2000).  By the end of 2002, when divisions
among EU members concerning the new American strategy became
increasingly consequential, ESDP had progressed to the point of
securing the reversal of Turkey’s veto on the use of Nato assets and
capabilities in ESDP  operations under the so-called Berlin plus
arrangements.  This will in principle pave the way for ESDP to take
charge of military operations in Bosnia and Macedonia.2
From the outset, the question was whether the pragmatic
approach put forward by France and Britain (capabilities ﬁrst) was
appropriate or whether the “political deﬁcit”, i.e. the absence of a
clearly formulated conceptual framework and policy guidelines,
would indeed become problematic.   As the Convention working
group on defence has noted, “the ESDP was deﬁned and developed
on the basis of the challenges and threats as evaluated in the
1990s”.  These were largely based on the tragic experience in the
Balkans.  The assumption was that the major security issues the
international community would have to face in the future would be
of the same kind as those provoked by the manifestations of
extreme nationalism, i.e. civil wars resulting in humanitarian trage-
dies, ethnic cleansing and massive violations of human rights.  The
EU therefore sought to put together the kinds of military capabilities
suited to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, or the so-called
“Petersberg missions” as they are termed in the TEU, which in real-
ity encompass the whole spectrum of military missions, with the
exception of collective defence.
Today, however, these assumptions are at odds with the interna-
tional context as it is deﬁned by the United States.  The war on ter-
rorism became, from 12 September 2001 onwards, the number-one
concern of US security policy, which shifted to homeland defence
1. The EU police force took over from the UN International Police Task Force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2002.
2. The ﬁrst ever EU military mission, Operation Concordia, was launched on 31
March 2003 as ESDP took over from Nato’s Operation Allied Harmony.  The app.
300-strong military force is tasked with protecting the EU/Organisation for Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission in place.  Operation
Concordia is expected to last for six months.  
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shored up by a doctrine that contemplates pre-emptive strikes or
wars as a viable option.  Furthermore, the terrorist threat was glob-
alised and associated with that posed by the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction, which formed the backbone of the
justiﬁcation for the invasion of Iraq.  The new international security
priorities set out by the Bush Administration do not correspond to
the world vision held by the EU as such or the vast majority of its
Member States, and thus ESDP ﬁnds itself thrown into confusion.
As far as the ﬁght against terrorism is concerned, the EU has stepped
up its co-operation with the United States and accelerated and
deepened integration in JHA.  The ﬁght against terrorism and tran-
snational criminality (human and drug trafﬁcking) also features
prominently in the EU’s own international co-operation agenda with
other areas of the world.
The EU is reluctant, however, to adopt the international security
agenda as deﬁned by the US Administration.  The EU as such and the
majority of Member States have also refrained from carving a role
for the military in combating terrorism at the internal level, other
than in clearly exceptional circumstances.  The fact that the UK
seems prepared to accept unquestioningly the US security agenda
does not bode well for European defence.  The Franco-British com-
promise reached in St Malo, which in effect marked the lifting of
the British veto on the EU taking on the security and defence dimen-
sion is now obsolete.  Also, there is much broader agreement on the
major threats to world peace as the United States deﬁnes them (tyr-
anny, WMD proliferation and terrorism) than about the way it is pre-
pared to confront them even among the security community in
countries such as France.  In other words, there is a sense that the
United States is raising the right questions but giving the wrong
answers.  One has only to think of the reasons why oil prices surged
brieﬂy at the beginning of the Iraq war to be reminded that, unless
the EU adopts a purely homeland defence posture, i.e. is prepared to
confront only those security issues which may have a direct short-
term military or economic impact on its well being, then the initial
assumptions of ESDP, barring minor adaptations, still hold.
Whatever the case, it should be noted that existing proposals
concerning security and defence (together with the major proposals
for institutional reform referred to above) have been tabled at the
European Convention so far by France and Germany.  Reinforced
co-operation or a “leading group” ready to proceed with deeper
integration in security and defence seems more than ever the way
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forward for ESDP out of its present predicament.1 No one expects,
however, a European security and defence policy to be fully credi-
ble without the full commitment of the UK.  It remains to be seen
how Tony Blair will evaluate the fall-out of Britain’s participation
in the war on Iraq (and perhaps more importantly the subsequent
peace) on his project to put Britain at the “heart of Europe”.  Fulﬁll-
ing Donald Rumsfeld’s prophecy and becoming the leader of a
“New Europe Club” within the EU, to be joined by the newcomers,
Spain and perhaps one or two others may be rather tempting.  But
this is one temptation Britain would do well to resist, if it wants to
avoid divisions of such gravity within the EU that they may well
lead –and the idea is already being ﬂoated– to a consolidation of the
trend towards a “European vanguard” or less likely to full-ﬂedged
political union between France and Germany as proposed by Pascal
Lamy and Gunter Verheugen (2003).
Mercosur: a Civil Power in the Making?
During the diplomatic battles in the run-up to the war on Iraq, the
high degree of political convergence between Latin America and
the EU as a whole in what concerns the international order again
became apparent.  The positions of France and Germany symptom-
atically converged with those of Chile and Mexico, the two Latin
American representatives on the Security Council in the run-up to
the war.  Chile arguably championed the collective stance of the
Mercosur members and associates, who unanimously stressed that
only the Security Council could authorise the use of force to ensure
compliance with its own resolutions.
This is not to say that Mercosur’s members stand absolutely
united when it comes to relations with the United States.  While
Brazil voiced total opposition to military intervention on the
grounds that, in the words of Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, “the
war is bound to aggravate instability in the Middle East and stir up
1. Belgium has promoted a high-level meeting to put forward proposals for the
creation of a Defence Group within ESDP.  France, Germany and Luxemburg were
supportive, and Portugal expressed its interest.  The timing of the meeting just
after the Iraq war was subject to criticism, however, and the original proposals
were watered down ahead of the actual mini-summit held at the end of April 2003
in order to avert accusations of further aggravating the European rift.
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the existing tensions between the West and the Islamic world”,
Argentina posed as “neutral”.   The fact that Mercosur, together
with its associate members Chile and Bolivia, felt the need to deﬁne
a common stance in an international issue of such magnitude is,
however, important in itself and indicative of its desire to take a
more active role in world affairs.1 Brazil’s President Lula actually
sought a negotiated solution at the UN level in order to persuade the
United States to moderate its impatience, and later deplored the fact
that the US  had resorted to military force without the Security
Council’s explicit backing.  Another example of this proactive atti-
tude is the “Friends of Venezuela” initiative launched by Brazil
with the participation of Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and the
United States.
The common feature is to be found in a clear preference for
diplomacy and the defence of multilateralism.  At the same time,
the ﬁght against terrorism and the region-wide successes in check-
ing weapons of mass destruction proliferation are stressed.  As far
as the relationship with the United States is concerned, all agree
broadly though with different nuances that strategic alliance with
the US remains a shared necessity on economic and security consid-
erations alike.  There is a marked resemblance, in other words, with
the position of the EU vis-à-vis the United States.
Mercosur and the EU, whether it is a matter of political elites or
public opinions, broadly converge on the following:
(i) A marked preference for a multilateral (not multipolar) world
order;
(ii) A growing suspicion verging on outright opposition to pre-
emption;
(iii)A profound sense of solidarity with the United States in the
wake of the 11 September attacks, demonstrated by the fact
that, on Brazil’s proposal, article 11 of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) was invoked, and
Nato for the ﬁrst time ever invoked Article 5 of the 1949 Wash-
ington Treaty.
The panoply of civilian power instruments at its disposal allows
the  EU to act if not decisively at least to some degree in world
affairs.  Mercosur has yet to create such instruments and mecha-
1. Statement issued by the Mercosur+2 Foreign Ministers meeting in Montevi-
deo, 5 February 2003.  
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nisms.  Equally, it has yet to devise a common foreign policy, and
its sphere of action is limited to the commercial and to some extent
economic arenas.  More so than in Europe, therefore, individual
states are in practice the sole actors in international affairs and
therefore the main EU interlocutors where region-to-region co-ordi-
nation in international affairs and security is concerned.
The main items on any inter-regional co-operation agenda would
seem to be the following:
(i) The promotion of a pro-active multilateral agenda with the aim
of bolstering the UN’s capacity to face major international secu-
rity issues.   The EU, Mercosur and the Rio Group should
engage in concerted action in order to co-ordinate positions at
the UN and especially at the Security Council level.  Issues
pertaining to the International Criminal Court and interna-
tional conventions dealing with the environment should be top
priorities;
(ii) The promotion of a “critical dialogue” with the United States in
an effort to lobby American institutions and decision-makers in
favour of the multilateralist approach with the aim of “multilat-
eralising” the United States, which remains as indispensable as
ever to the resolution of any major international crisis;
(iii)The joint exploration of the civilian-power approach to crisis
prevention and management and post-conﬂict rehabilitation,
namely in what concerns the Andean countries.   A common
approach to the crisis in Colombia, especially in regard to con-
certed anti-terror action and promoting democracy and human
rights would seem to be the ﬁrst priority to be addressed;
(iv) The promotion of a structured region-to-country security dia-
logue, between the new EU security mechanisms and Mercosur
and its members and associates, with a focus on peacekeeping
and crisis management.
Two unknowns are essential for the success of EU/Mercosur co-
operation.  On the one hand is what kind of “animal” the EU will
have developed into as the Convention (and the subsequent inter-
governmental conference) comes to a close and a constitutional
treaty governing a 25-strong EU ﬁnally comes into effect.  On the
other hand is whether the impact of change in Brazil and the new
kind of leadership it may provide to Mercosur will enable it to over-
come the many existing factors of crisis.  Recent statements seem
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to indicate that political co-operation is on the rise and its main ele-
ment seems to be a shared multilateralist stance.
Looking back on the last decade of the twentieth century, the
1990s can be deﬁned as a consolidation of regionalism, with the
deepening of the EU, the emergence of Mercosur and the begin-
nings of the hemispheric FTA.  Working towards their shared vision
of a multilateral world order based on regionalism may well be the
most relevant contribution the EU and Mercosur can make to inter-
national peace and security into the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Álvaro de VASCONCELOS
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Alvaro de Vasconcelo’s chapter is a very subtle and challenging
reﬂection on the role that democratic regional integration pro-
cesses, like the European Union or Mercosur, can play, as “civil
powers”, in reviving and redeﬁning multilateralism in a time when
the international order is essentially shaped by the domineering
world power of the United States.
The main point of his analysis deals with the lessons that can be
drawn from the very process of building a European international




  today, is cleverly deﬁned as a “federation in
reverse”, where the centre possesses those responsibilities that are
normally the prerogatives of states in ordinary federal systems,
leaving to member states those that devolve upon federal govern-
ments –foreign policy, defense and taxation.  But it is not very
likely that the Union can act as a decisive international player with-
out correcting that imbalance.  The caveat is that the Europeans





, for the simple reason that the integration process
of their democratic states consists on strengthening a supranational
body built on norms and rules that delegitimise power politics
among its members.  Thus, there cannot be any possible consensus
on a common foreign policy based on principles that contradict
those that regulate relations among the member states and under-




itself.  Therefore, if it wants to become a major world player, the
Union cannot agree to an international “multipolar” order based on
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an unstable balance of power system.  It needs a “multilateral”
international system based on norms and rules.
Another important point raised by A.  Vasconcelos is that the
principles of the “old multilateralism” embodied in the network of
international institutions created at the end of World War II –with
the United Nations at its core– is not enough to cope with today’s
challenges and threats.   Actually, there is a broad agreement in
Europe with the major threats to world peace as the United States
now deﬁnes them (tyranny, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism), albeit there is no consensus on how to
confront them.  And there is also a growing awareness of the need
to protect human rights and to develop multilateral principles of
international behavior in a world which is every day more
interdependent.  Therefore, upholding the status quo is no longer a





that promotes “regime change” and “preemptive” military action




, as well as
all the other countries interested in the survival of the multilateral
system, are compelled, even by their own public opinions, to be a
lot less tolerant of double standards and become much more pro-
active in the promotion of democratic transitions and respect for
human rights worldwide (e.g. the consensual outcry for an Ameri-
can military intervention in Liberia in the summer of 2003).




 is closely linked to
its ability to shape a world order that acknowledges the changing
position of the state in international affairs and accepts important
limitations to state sovereignty.   This “new multilateralism” is
based on the need for the international community to take responsi-




, for the protection of the rights of
individuals, above and beyond sovereign boundaries, to promote
regional integration as a structural feature of the international sys-
tem and to support rules and institutions that strengthen multilateral
governance.
Vasconcelos is well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of a




 is quite suc-
cessful as regional player on the European continent, promoting
peace and democratization through a strategy of inclusion and pre-
vention of crisis.  But this strategy can function only when the pros-
pect for outside states to become effective members of the Union is
real and when political conditionality can be fully brought to bear.
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In fact, when the promised reward is far greater than the penalties
imposed.  This “soft power” approach has had far less results to
show when applied to other parts of the world, including close




 security policy –the Mediterranean and
the Balkans– or for that matter, Iraq or Sub-Saharan Africa.   Actu-
ally, the Europeans found themselves deeply divided by historic
perceptions and distinct post-colonial interests, as well as by the
fact that, concerning these issues, the main political incentive of a




– is out of question.
The truth is that there is no law –and no multilateral norms and
rules– without some kind of a policeman.  In the real world today,
no lasting and stable order is even remotely possible without the
commitment of the United States, which is the only player with a





is also committed to playing by the rules.  Like it or not, it was the
American military strength, controlled by a strong democracy, that









 Charter.  On the assumption that Europe, for the time being,
cannot fully play the power game –which, anyhow, would have no




 member states– the core




.  But due to the huge
“hard power” asymmetry, how can the Europeans avoid a mere sur-
rogate role, restricted to “soft security” (post-conﬂict reconstruc-
tion and nation-building), leaving hard security decisions and
implementation to the United States? For Vasconcelos, the solution





 policy and getting round the dilemma of either an auto-
matic alignment, or a principled but vain opposition that, in any
case, will always threaten European unity.
For such a strategy of “multilateralizing” the United States to
have some credibility, the ﬁrst condition should be that European
policy moves away from the traditional, amalgamating, “Atlanti-
cism” and towards a more balanced Euro-American partnership.
But the second condition is that it cannot be solely a European




 needs allies that share the same view and objec-
tives in world affairs.  The biggest the coalition of democratic civil




 policy can effectively be
inﬂuenced.  Today, regarding the international order, there is no
other partner than Latin America that has such high degree of polit-




.  This is particularly true concerning
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the Mercosur which Vasconcelos describes as a civil power in the
making, despite the fact that it is even farther behind Europe on
devising something looking remotely like a common foreign pol-




 could override its purely domestic considerations
(e.g. its hyper protectionist agricultural policy) in order to acceler-
ate the advent of the Association Agreement between the two blocs,
one could envisage some form of efﬁcient biregional political coop-
eration for the promotion of a pro-active multilateral agenda and a
more structured security dialogue.
The trouble with this sophisticated civilian power agenda is that,
to be credible, it has to give convincing answers to international cri-
sis situations when the use of force is necessary and legitimate.
Without taking full responsibility for the security of the interna-





 and Mercosur will have no other option than accepting to
remain wholly dependant on American military capabilities and
thus, on Washington’s vision, decisions and political good will.
Vasconcelos’s paper bumps on a circular paradox: “new multilater-
alism” needs civilian powers to support it and military “teeth” to
defend it, but these civilian powers cannot become military powers
without destroying their own self and the multilateral system.










with trying to revert to an implausible multipolar system, based on
a balance of power, that could be more dangerous than today’s sit-
uation and in which the huge power asymmetry will anyhow guar-
antee American hegemony for a long time.
   As a matter of fact, Vasconcelo’s reﬂection opens a trail for fur-
ther developments of new ideas on this crucial link between the
necessary strengthening of multilateralism and international law
enforcing.  If civilian powers –that are vital for the functioning of a
multilateral international system– want to have a preeminent role
on the decision-making process about world security, they will have
to take multilateralism seriously, including on the issue of the use of
force.   The resurgence of the debate on the role of the United





a symptom of this renewed motivation to tackle this challenge.
Does that mean that civilian powers should accept deep limitations
on their sovereignties in order to plan and organize their military
capabilities as part of a multilateral rapid reaction law-enforcing
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expeditionary force? Is this perspective incompatible with
“national defense” or “European defense”? What should be the
responsibilities of regional organizations and can they still be based
on the non-intervention principle? Are the biggest European and




 Charter’s Chapter VII so it can respond to new threats, like ter-
rorism and proliferation, and legitimize the systematic defense of
human rights principles, which implies sometimes the use of force




? Can all this be enough
to convince the United States to play –and even to lead– by multi-
lateral rules? These are some of many questions that should be dealt
with in future research programs of our Working Group.
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and a New Development Paradigm
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Managing Financial Crisis 
in Emerging Markets: 




Section 1 provides a summary of the debate on Sovereign Debt
Restructuring.  To this end, we report on a recent conference in


















  In the light of Mexico’s issue of debt that




s) –and of cool market




 own proposal by the market– we






















).  After surveying these three pro-
posals, we consider the incentives for continued reform.
In section 2, we discuss a model of sovereign debt crises that




 failure and debtor’s





 with multiple equilibria, where the choice of equilib-




 constraint that the sovereign
debtor must retain the incentive to service its debt.  It is quite likely
that this incentive constraint rules out the “no-crisis equilibrium.”
 





















forum a year before; see Miller (2002).
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Instead, the equilibrium following debt default may be one in which
creditors randomise between quitting and staying; or even one in
which they all quit, depending on how severe the incentive problem
is.  In general, there are too many crises.   We go on to discuss
brieﬂy how interest rates will depend on the equilibrium selected
and how the model might be calibrated to the data, with parameters
chosen so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary over a range
running from 300 to 7000 basis points.   The possible perverse
effects of unregulated ﬁnancial liberalisation are also discussed
using this framework.
In section 3, we discuss how the incidence of crises might be
reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures, involv-
ing “contractibility” of sovereign debtor’s payoffs, suspension of
convertibility in a “discovery” phase and penalties in case of mal-




’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the Collective
Action Clauses which some promote as an alternative.  But the









back burner together with the recent developments in the market for
sovereign debt suggest that Collective Action Clauses are far more








.  In the light of Mexico’s




 in February 2003 containing Col-
lective Action Clauses, we study the impact of such clauses on
creditor coordination.   We begin by extending the two creditor





allowing for the possibility that creditors have asymmetric informa-
tion about future project net worth.  We then study a special case of
this model with three agents.  From the Bayesian equilibria of this
game we derive the probability of uncoordinated sovereign debt
crises without collective action clauses and show that introducing
Collective Action Clauses lowers this probability.
Section 4 turns to political economy matters.  After a brief out-
line of general issues, we examine “political contagion” in Latin
America.  We argue that wide-spread support for debt default in
Argentina may have led to the high sovereign spreads seen in Brazil
as Lula surged ahead in the polls.  We analyse how a self-fulﬁlling





ing in exchange for the incoming president’s commitment ﬁscal
prudence together with a process of “learning to trust Lula” on the
part of creditors.
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The trigger for change.    
 
Why change the current international
ﬁnancial architecture? Has it not served the world well since the
Bretton Woods System established at the end of World War II gave
way to ﬂoating rates in the early 1970s? These questions deserve
some response, however brief, before turning to the sometimes
arcane details of the current debate.
The single most striking piece of evidence of the inadequacy of
the status quo is the high incidence of ﬁnancial crises, particularly
since 1973.  As indicated by data provided by Bordo (2002) and
Eichengreen (2002), the frequency of crises since 1973 was about
10% per annum for a each country in a sample of 21 mainly devel-
oped economies (for which data is available since 1880) and about
12% for a wider sample of 56 countries including emerging market
economies, see right hand bars in Figure 1 below.
 
Figure 1.  
 
Crisis frequency (percent probability per year)
 
This frequency (of about one in ten) is 
 
approximately double
what it was under the Gold Standard
 
 1880 -1913, the earlier period
of ﬁnancial globalization (when each country faced a one in twenty



















Source: Michael Bordo (2002).
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  With the exception of the interwar period,
1919-1939, which includes the Great Depression, it is the highest
incidence of crises since 1880.
As Rogoff (2003) has recently noted: “private ﬂows to emerging
markets are remarkable for their unpleasant side effects –wild
booms, spectacular crashes, over-indebtedness, excessive reliance
on short-term and foreign-currency denominated debt, and pro-
tracted stagnation following a debt crisis.  [There] is an excessive
reliance on ‘dangerous’ forms of debt, such as foreign-currency
denominated debt and short-term debt, which aggravate the pain of
crises when they occur”.
Though increasing world trade and the scope of market forces
more generally has undoubtedly raised per capita incomes dramat-
ically, the same claims cannot be made for the growth of interna-




  Has the growth of debt markets
enhanced growth? Has it reduced the volatility of consumption? It
is hardly surprising that the answer as to the social value of emerg-











A summary of the debate.    
 
What goes wrong with bond markets?
and what can be done about it? A recent paper by Nouriel Roubini
and Brad Setser (2003) addresses just these questions.  It is with
some trepidation that one seeks to summarize this synthesis.  Nev-
ertheless Figure 2 may prove a useful guide to the cut and thrust of
the debate that follows.  On the left hand side are the potential prob-
lems aicting markets in sovereign debt –a veritable catalogue of
disaster.   In the columns of the table are the various solutions
 
1. As Rogoff (1999) had earlier put it: “The 1990s ﬁnancial crises have
brought a sharp contraction of lending to the developing world, and there is a
serious concern that the fallout will continue to inhibit international capital mar-
kets for some time to come.  The exact timing and nature of speculative attacks on
emerging market economies is a topic of great debate [b]ut in the majority of
cases, there is little question that the attacks were exacerbated by the way that
many developing country governments chose to open their capital markets radi-
cally to the rest of the world during the early 1990s.”
2. Kenneth Rogoff is not the only one speaking out against too much sove-
reign borrowing by emerging markets in the form of bonds and bank loans, and
relying too much on foreign-currency-denominated (or foreign-currency-indexed)
debt; in this regard, see Goldstein (2003).
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  how things have evolved without fundamental
reform of the system.  This phrase, used by Roubini and Sedser,
should not be taken to imply situation of stasis, as there has in fact
been a good deal of evolutionary development in the last few years
–the use of exit consents swaps as a form of “Private Sector
Involvement”, to give but one example.
 
1. When augmented by the two items in parentheses, this yields the Status
Quo Plus.
Figure 2. Roubini and Sedser’s Catalogue of Woe: 
and Four Modes of Resolution
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The status quo has proved crisis prone, as we have seen above.
But, as Daniel Cohen and Richard Portes (2003, p. 1) argue in their




 Reform”, it also shows signs of unsustainabil-
ity: “The absence of a framework for orderly workouts increases




 and G7 to step in with bailout packages,








: it would like
to “Just say No” when member countries in crisis call for liquidity
support; but because the alternatives are so dire this is not credible.
There is concern that investors, knowing that their lending is under-









  But there comes a timewhen the sheer size and speed of
capital ﬂows must overwhelm the efforts of well-intentioned per-




  What then? The various alternatives
listed in the next three columns may be considered in turn.
 




s) [see column 1 of Figure 2]
 
An answer proposed much earlier, shortly after the Mexican cri-





s) into private bond contracts so that they can be restructured
when a super-majority of say 75% of creditors agree to do so, see
Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and the Rey Report (1996).  In this
respect bonds are made more like equities, as their pay-outs can, at
the discretion of the creditors, be made state-contingent.  Indeed, as
Roubini and Setser (2003, pp. 20-21) point out, “Bonds governed
by English law typically allow a qualiﬁed majority to amend key
ﬁnancial terms.  [But] those emerging markets that typically issue
dollar bonds governed by New York law were reluctant to change
the documentation they use in New York or to shift their dollar issu-
ance to London”.  They go on conclude that “the challenge is actu-
 
1. This is discussed in more detail in Miller (2002), for example.




 support gives a false sense of security to investors,
which magniﬁes booms in the run-up to the crisis (as in Russia in 1998)”. Rogoff
(2003) §1.
3. Perhaps December 1997 was the deﬁning moment, when the market failed













 member.  Default was only averted
by a coordinated rollover of banks short-term investments orchestrated by G10
ﬁnance ministers and central banks– a form of government-induced suspension of
convertibility.
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ally quite simple: changing market practice in bonds governed by
‘New York law’”.
Until February 2003, when Mexico issued a billion dollars of




s at a very respectable




 treasuries, there seemed to





s 22”, another manifestation of the time-consistency trap.
In their words:
 
Both issuers and underwriters [in New York] are trying to sell
bonds and fear the chilling effect of “prenuptial agreements”.  Most
important, however, is that lenders expect bailouts as long as there is
no alternative, established procedure for Private Sector Involvement.
As long as the ofﬁcial sector provides bailout packages, there is no




s; but there must be bailouts in
the absence of an alternative that would limit the costs of default.
 
Not surprisingly, the Mexican initiative commanded great atten-





s 22.  Was this a signal of hope for emerging markets? Or
was it proof that Mexico has grown to be the very Houdini of the
emerging economy bond markets? The message was mixed.  Mex-
ico currently has strong balance of payments, high foreign
exchange reserves, buoyant oil revenues and investment-grade rat-
ing: so it seemed a good time to go to the market.  But this may be
cold comfort for those not so well placed.


















 a minimum requirement of 25% of the outstanding
principal for acceleration (with a 50% requirement to de-acceler-
ate).  These clauses, whose signiﬁcance we further analyse below,
may be just what the doctor ordered; but the circumstances needed
for a propitious launch seem daunting.
Roubini and Setser (2003) and some London market participants




s “to minimize the number of
moving parts”.  But, in a subsequent Newsletter, Michael Gavin




 Warburg commended the Mexican initiative on
the grounds that “the covenants in the recent issue were not meant
as a ﬁnal, take-it-or-leave-it offer on a template that would be
applied rigidly to its future issues”.
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The response of discussants, faced with a checklist of key ques-
tions by the chair, are summarised in Figure 3.
Note that the position taken by Cohen and Portes, who argued
for standardised contracts of mandatory issue in key ﬁnancial sec-
tors, contrasted sharply with the more ﬂexible and voluntary posi-




    Roubini and Setser (2003, p.  14)
propose a step-bystep compromise, beginning with encouragement
and moving further if necessary: “If other New York law issuers do
not follow Mexico’s lead, the ofﬁcial [sector] should be prepared to
go beyond jawboning to arm-twisting, and eventually to seek regu-
lation or legislation that would require the use of clauses.  This









 authorities to impose
change on the market if those countries that typically issue in dol-




Bergsten’s checklist of key issues: and the variety of replies
 
Code of Good Conduct
 
Jean-Claude Trichet of the Banque de France presented a pro-
posal that found considerable support, namely the formulation of
 
1. The point was made that, to provide the right incentives such voluntarism
might need to be matched with a “cap” on ofﬁcial ﬁnance, as proposed by the























and Mexico preferred 





Q2 How much ofﬁcial 
pressure needed?
No comment History suggests pressure 





Moral suasion or 
regulation?
Moral suasion perhaps, 
but no more
Key ﬁnancial centers to 
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rules of good conduct together with a “road map” to guide debtors,









develop a comprehensive non-statutory framework, which seeks to
address debt-servicing problems while preserving to the maximum
extent possible contractual agreements.  Indeed, a Code carefully
listing what is expected from all parties concerned in times of sov-
ereign ﬁnancial distress could provide a pragmatic way for stake-
holders to optimise their behaviour.  This framework is intended to
incorporate “best practices” which are not mandatory but rather of




Banque de France’s Code of Good Conduct
 
A warm welcome for this proposal on behalf of the creditors has
been provided by Michael Gavin (2003, p. 6), who also drew out
the implications it might have for the debate in general: 
 
The code would not of course be legally enforceable, but that
doesn’t mean that the norms that are laid out in such a code would not
provide some useful guidance (and moral suasion) going forward.




s and Code would probably solve so
many of the political and substantive problems that now plague the




 to solve the few
remaining problems would be tough to sustain.
 





  Club for sovereign debt restructuring debt he proposed is more
accord with the Anglo-Saxon custom and practice.
Code of Best Practices for Sovereign Restructuring:
Nine main principles and best practices
1. Early engagement with creditors
2. Fair information sharing among all interested parties
3. Fair representation of creditors
4. An expeditious and cooperative process
5. Comparable treatment among creditors
6. Fair Burden Sharing between debtor and creditor
7. Good-faith negotiation
8. Preservation of the debtor’s ﬁnancial situation
9. Rapid restoration of debt sustainability
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Others such as Roubini and Setser (2003, pp. 10-11) are more
sceptical: 
 
No matter what the Code aims to do, particular attention needs to
be given to the set of incentives that will lead all parties to have an
interest in abiding by a non-binding Code.  In theory, adherence to
the Code during the restructuring could be a condition for creditors’
ﬁnal agreement on restructuring terms.  However, this raises obvious
problems of time consistency.  If the debtor dithers for a few years
before [it] ﬁnally gets its act together and then puts forward an
acceptable proposal, creditors are unlikely to turn the proposal down
just to punish the debtor for failing to live up to a code immediately
after its default.  A code of conduct potentially could help to facilitate
a restructuring well before most bond contracts contain collective
action clauses.   Most proposals are not intended to substitute for
efforts to introduce of new clauses into bond documentation.
 
Something like the Code of Good Behaviour is surely needed to
promote more efﬁcient coordination between the parties involved




’s: but a voluntary code has no power to
enforce decisions on minority creditors.  This is the main reason













  economists had the opportunity to describe and




 they had been pursuing for many
years –much more actively since they were encouraged by Paul
O’Neill to look for a “better way” than simply providing bailouts.




 during the Asian crisis and now spe-





s into sovereign bond contracts and the promotion of a Code
of Good Conduct.  Worthy as they may be, however, he judged





  To start with, the clauses incorporated in Mexican sovereign
debt are not nearly as ambitious as those proposed by John Taylor
 




 have been indicated in the summary Figure
2.  They include a stay on debt payments; seniority status for new creditors; Super
Majority Voting by creditors in each class of debt; the prospects for aggregation
across classes; and last of all a Dispute Resolution Forum.
2. For more details on his position see Boorman (2003).
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 Treasury backed contractual changes a year
before: and the code advocated by the Bank of France and groups
of bond traders have not yet been agreed.  More fundamentally, he
asserted that, in handling problems of aggregation across creditors,
“synthesising by contract” is not possible –thus challenging the
view of New York ﬁnanciers Morgan Chase who claim that two-
stage swaps can do the job.  Finally he concluded that CACs are a
complement, but not an effective substitute, for SDRM; and made it
clear he thought the IMF needed extra statutory powers to do its job
properly.
Conceding that the original SDRM  proposal may have been
“Fund-centric”, he claimed that current proposals are “creditor-
centric”.  Figure 5 below provides a schematic comparison of the
original proposal of November 2001, SDRM-1 with the revision pro-
vided in 2002, SDRM-2; it also indicates how these plans attempt to
replicate key features of corporate bankruptcy procedures under
Chapter 11 of the US Code.  As indicated by the asterisks in the
table, under the revised plan creditors can speciﬁcally decide: a) on
extending the temporary stay on debt service, b) on the provision of
seniority for DIP ﬁnance, c) on the restructuring of each class of
debt.  In addition, Mr Boorman said, creditors can terminate pro-
ceedings.
Michael Mussa, head of IMF Research till mid-2001, offered
scant support.  He reiterated a point made by his IIE colleague Ted
Truman (2002) to effect that, of the last eight crises handled by the
IMF, Argentina is the only case for which the SDRM is directly rele-
vant.  In any case, he argued against the ex-post revision of private
contracts as the right way to proceed.  The IMF, he argued, should
“Just say No!” But, as Jack Boorman was quick to point out, “You
have to ask what is going to happen then” (i.e. if you say no).  “If
there is not a reasonable process”, he noted, “then your answer is
affected.”
The implication that the IMF simply said yes was promptly chal-
lenged by Matthew Fisher.  The failure to achieve a pre-default deal
in Argentina was not for lack of trying, he said: Mr. Cavallo was talk-
ing of administering a “haircut” in late 2001, for example.  But how
could one secure collective action without CACs? The only solution
was the use of exit consent swaps: but there was a risk that these
might lead to a collapse of banking system.  If a prior default could
have been done it would have been great: but it was not possible.
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Figure 5. Chapter 11 and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)
Kenneth Rogoff, Michael Mussa’s successor in the IMF Research
Department, dismissed the view that the status quo is just ﬁne.  He
tried to shift the whole perspective of discussion, noting that “It’s
not the asset class (sovereign debt) we want to secure –it’s
resources for Emerging Market Economies.” He argued that the
current system is unduly biased towards debt ﬂows1 and spoke per-
suasively of the need to rechannel capital ﬂows into other instru-
ments.  (This was an echo of what he had earlier called My Plan in
Rogoff (1999), where he proposed a short term run-down of bond
markets, see Addendum below.)
Strategic considerations
The IMF and its critics.    Key points made on each side are outlined
in what follows.  In conclusion, however, we argue that the situa-
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* to be decided by creditors.
1. For further details see Rogoff (2003), “Emerging Market Debt.  What is the
Problem?”
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tion is in reality one of ﬁne balance: in reshaping the architecture as
in restructuring debt, blocking minorities can play a key strategic
role.  If SDRM is put on the back burner, it is important that PSI be
revived as a threat to keep CACs coming.
On one side of the ﬁnal debate were the protagonists for market
voluntarism, backing CACs without an SDRM, happy to make com-
mon cause with the Banque de France and its voluntary Code of
Good Conduct.  Market participants took this view.  On the other
side was the IMF, willing to endorse these changes, but ﬁghting still
for fundamental statutory reform along the lines charted by Anne
Krueger.  A compromise was offered by Daniel Cohen and Richard
Portes.   Drawing on the history of sovereign debt restructuring
before the IMF was created, they proposed non-voluntary CACs,
together with institutional changes to promote creditor co-ordina-
tion –a New York Club, for example.
Speaking for the debtors, Agustín Carstens of Mexico noted that
fears of moral hazard had led to IMF to encourage private sector
involvement.   With the suspension of automatic bailouts, he
claimed reckless investors have been excluded from emerging mar-
kets.   But capital ﬂows have declined; and Mexico alone had
received 70% of capital ﬂows to Latin America last year.  To bring
other countries back to the market, creditors wanted CACs plus
Codes.  He criticised the SDRM for what he termed insurmountable
problems of unconstitutionality and unpredictability, and recom-
mended that the IMF –“the best working international institution”–
should not put itself at risk in pursuing this initiative any further.
Michael Dooley (Deutsche Bank) speaking for the creditors,
acknowledged that the status quo is very costly and argued that
CACs are useful particularly if supplemented by the Code of Good
Practice and a Forum for negotiations.  But he was highly critical
of the SRDM, which he described as a radical change where the
debtor plus the IMF determine “when bond contract become equity
contracts” and the IMF reserves the right to get out before private
creditors!
In response, Kenneth Rogoff (IMF) reiterated his view that capi-
tal ﬂows in the form of equity played an important and stabilising
role in world capital markets.  He also pointed out that the IMF typ-
ically commits itself to supplying loans at times when no one else
is willing to do so: stripping the IMF of seniority would reduce fund-
ing to zero, he said, “But how would that help?”
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Finally, Michael Mussa (IIE) observed that efforts to promote the
SDRM are “premature” –but argued that the proposal should not be
dropped.  To put it into action, however, there needs to be a demon-
strable case– maybe Argentina if private negotiations fail.
Strategic Considerations.    If proposing SDRM was premature, as
Michael Mussa suggests, was the whole exercise a waste of time? If
it is put on the back burner, will this affect incentives for reform?
Some insights may be gleaned from a strategic analysis where one
treats the evolution of the IFA as the outcome of a game between the
IMF and the creditors.  A rudimentary version is outlined in Figure 6
that follows, designed to capture the game as it ﬁrst appeared in the
Fall of 2001 when Paul O’Neill asked the IMF to look into creating
an SDRM.  Note that payoffs for either player are ranked with letter
grades where  .
As formulated here, the IMF simply chooses whether to push the
SDRM or not, while the creditors decide whether or not to implement
CACs.  The payoffs are shown in the Table, with that for the IMF
shown ﬁrst and for the creditors second.  It is assumed that the IMF
rates the achievement of SDRM as an a, the adoption of CACs without
an SDRM as a b, and the Status Quo without either, as a d.  But the
creditors take the opposite view: for them the status quo is just ﬁne,
a; CACs are acceptable, b; but the SDRM is a monster from another
planet, d.  (So it is pretty much a zero-sum game.) For the IMF with
a green light for reform, as in the Fall of 2001, it is evident that pur-
suing the SDRM is the dominant strategy (always yields a).  This
leaves creditors choosing whether or not to add CACs; which they do
as this gives them some more control of proceedings.1  The Nash
equilibrium of this game, shown in bold in the bottom right cell, pre-
dicts major developments in the international ﬁnancial architecture,
with the changes both to private contracts and statutory procedures.
Figure 6. The situation in the Fall of 2001: IMF leads “twin-track” reform





No SDRM d,a b,b
SDRM a,d a,b
* Assuming no veto of the SDRM.
abgd >>>
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This may be how things appeared to the IMF early in the process,
but neither the market nor many borrowers have supported SDRM;
and if they don’t want it, the US Congress is unlike to approve.1  [It
takes 85% of the vote to change the IMF’s Articles of Agreement
and the US has the power to block such changes on its own: other
major debtors countries like Mexico and Brazil would doubtless
have joined a blocking coalition.2] On the other hand, Mexico has
incorporated CACs in its latest NY bond issue.  An interesting fea-
ture of the clauses incorporated was that, while the Super-Majority
Vote for changing ﬁnancial terms was cut from unanimity to 75%,
the required vote to change non-ﬁnancial terms was increased from
50% to 75%.  Why so? Because creditors who accept such CACs
thus reduce their exposure to exit consent swaps, i.e. avoid involun-
tary Private Sector Involvement [PSI].
This is important if we assume that reform efforts in the near
future will focus on CACs, together with the option of using exit
consent swaps acting a credible threat.  In Figure 7, where the IMF
now chooses whether or not to use PSI, the payoffs are as the previ-
ous Figure 6 except that we change the IMF “payoff” in the bottom
right hand corner from a to g  to reﬂect the difﬁculty of implement-
ing PSI with Mexican-style CACs.
Where CACs are structured in this way, pursuing PSI is not a dom-
inant strategy on the part of the IMF.  But it can still function as a
threat.  This can be seen most clearly with the aid of Figure 8,
which shows the options available at different stages, assuming that
creditors can implement CACs before the IMF forces PSI.
Starting at the second stage, it is clear that the IMF will not
enforce involuntary PSI if CACs have been implemented –thanks to
the anti-exit consent swap provisions.  It will do so otherwise, how-
ever, to avoid a return to the status quo ante.  Faced with this state-
contingent IMF response (shown by the dark arrows in the lower
part of the ﬁgure), how will the creditors behave? With their pre-
ferred outcome of No CACs and No PSI ruled out, their best option
is to implement CACs –otherwise they get will be faced with exit
consent swaps!
1. And of course, Mr. O’Neill is no longer holds ofﬁce.
2. See Leech (2002, p. 389). Table 1 for an evaluation of voting power on such
matters at the IMF.
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Figure 7. The current situation: IMF backs CACs with threat of PSI
Figure 8. Will the Market continue with CACs to avoid PSI?
Conclusions
Mexico has taken initiative of including CACs in its New York
debts; and Brazil has been quick to follow.  Or will with SDRM on
the back burner and no alternative incentives for change, is there a
risk that the whole movement to reform the international ﬁnancial
architecture could go back to square one? Roubini and Setser have
proposed a step-by-step process of pro-activism by the US regula-
tory authorities as one means of providing the right incentives.
Reactivating the threat of Private Sector Involvement implemented
by exit consent swaps is another.
But the progress of time and the process of learning may also
change payoffs and incentives.  Thus, up until a few weeks ago, it
was widely thought that issuers would only be willing to pay the
premium demanded by the market for CACs if they were under the
threat of the SDRM.  The Mexican placement was made without the
need to pay a premium, however, and the bond continues to trade
well the buy-side shows growing recognition that CACs are a good




No PSI d,a b,b
PSI (exit consent) a,d g,b
*Assuming that PSI becomes less feasible when CACs are implemented
Creditors IMF payoff shown first
(d,a) (g,b) (b,b)( a,d)
IMF
CACs No CACs
No PSI No PSI PSI PSI
IMF
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it plans to use CACs in its forthcoming debt operation.) So there is
some ground for optimism that the momentum toward CACs can be
maintained even if the SDRM is put on the back burner.
We might consider three possible lines of development.  First, if
creditors in sovereign bond markets –like those in London corpo-
rate markets– come sufﬁciently to appreciate the beneﬁts of CACs,
they will be no need for regulatory enforcement nor PSI as a threat.
So it will be a world of CACs and Codes.
Second, if the resolution of the Argentine situation drags on for a
long time, things may look very different.  There could be a loss of
conﬁdence in market –driven solutions and all bets will be off– as
the need to avoid any repetition re-ignites the search for systemic
reform.   With demonstrable reason to reconsider the SDRM, for
example, the strategic equilibrium might return to what it was in
2001 with renewed pursuit of the twin-track approach.  This could
lead to a world with new contracts and new Articles for the IMF.
Third and, in our view, most likely, is an evolutionary outcome
where CACs will be widely adopted (but will not prove to be sufﬁ-
cient to handle solvency crises on their own); where the SDRM will
not be adopted because it is too ambitious, but CACs will be com-
bined with Codes and with IMF involvement to supply emergency
funding and impose conditionality.  In practice, this will consitute a
mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt in all but name!
Addendum: K. Rogoff (1999) My “Plan”: and a Criticism
The main problem with the present system is that it contains strong
biases towards debt ﬁnance, especially towards intermediation by
banks, and does not adequately support equity ﬁnance and direct
investment.  If ﬂows to developing countries took the form of equity
and direct investment, there would be an automatic device for risk
sharing.  Country runs could still lead to sharp drops in local stock
markets, but there would be no liquidity effects, no need for a lender
of last resort or a crisis manager.
In Bulow and Rogoff, we recommend restricting countries’ ability
to waive sovereign immunity as means of discouraging the mediation
of debt contracts in industrialized country courts.  Instituting an inter-
national bankruptcy court might be an alternative means to the same
end.  As a result of such a policy change, there could be a signiﬁcant
transition period where capital ﬂows to certain countries were
reduced.  Lenders would avoid countries lacking either sound legal
systems for enforcing commercial contracts, transparent and fair reg-
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ulatory systems, or favourable histories of treatment towards foreign
investors.  However, countries that want to draw on world capital
markets will have a strong incentive to develop institutions that would
support foreign investor conﬁdence.  By the same token, they will
have an incentive to develop fair, transparent, and well-regulated
equity markets to help attract capital ﬂows.
In the concluding discussion of the Paris meeting, Ricardo Haus-
mann appeared to criticise such a plan.  While he agreed that capital
markets have not provided for efﬁcient risk sharing, he argued that
for the IMF to walk away violated the Monkey Principle: “Don’t
throw away the vine you’re on, before you have another to go to.”
Co-ordination Failure and Moral Hazard: 
the Full Information Case
Introduction
In criticising the conventional wisdom –also known as the Wash-
ington Consensus– Guillermo Calvo of Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank has argued that emerging market ﬁnance is subject to
market failures with potentially disastrous consequences.  At the
UTDT summer workshop in Buenos Aires in August 2002, indeed,
he proposed that whether or not a theory of sovereign debt crisis
includes “sudden stops” should be a crucial test of its empirical rel-
evance for emerging market ﬁnance, see Calvo et al. (2002).  In his
recent book on the international monetary system, Tirole (2002,
pp. ix-x) evidently takes much the same perspective: he begins by
referring to the wide consensus that has emerged among econo-
mists that “capital account liberalisation... was unambiguously
good.  Good for the debtor countries, good for the world economy”
but goes on to note “that consensus has been shattered lately.  A
number of capital account liberalizations have been followed by
spectacular foreign exchange and banking crises.” Following Rus-
sia’s partial foreign debt repudiation in August 1998, for example,
generous inﬂows to Latin America came to a standstill; and sover-
eign interest rate spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on the
Emerging Market Bond index (EMBI+).
These developments –together with the collapsing currencies
and soaring sovereign spreads facing many Latin American coun-
tries in 2001/2– have put in question traditional explanations for
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ﬁnancial crises, based on current account and ﬁscal deﬁcits.  They
suggest the need to focus on the intrinsic behaviour of capital
markets.
The focus of this section is on how problems of creditor co-
ordination interact with debtor’s incentives to generate excessive
crises.  In the academic literature, these issues are typically treated
separately.   In explaining “bank runs”, for example, the classic
paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrates the possibility
of multiple equilibria in ﬁnancial markets, but takes as given the
structure of demand deposit contracts (i.e. the right of depositors to
withdraw on demand) and the choice of investments by the bank.
To help select the “good” equilibrium, three institutional mecha-
nisms were discussed –provision of liquidity, suspension of convert-
ibility and deposit insurance.  Analogous co-ordination problems
arise in connection with emerging-market bonds and similar pro-
posals have recently been made with respect to sovereign debt.
Stanley Fischer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Truman
(2001), for example, have emphasised ofﬁcial provision of liquidity;
while Krugman (1998) called for capital outﬂow controls to protect
East Asian currencies (i.e. a suspension of convertibility).  There
has not been much talk of explicit insurance, Soros (1998) and
Jeanne (2001) being exceptions: but an additional possibility has
been widely discussed, that of revising the nature of sovereign debt
contracts themselves.  Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Buchheit and
Gulati (2000) and Taylor (2002) have advocated the insertion of col-
lective action clauses to assist creditor co-ordination.
Proposals like these, designed to solve creditor coordination
problems, have been criticised for failing to take into account their
effect on sovereign debtors’ incentives.  Barro (1998, p. 18), for
example, suggested that bail-outs can increase the probability of
sovereign default, stating that “bailouts increase ‘moral hazard’ by
rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments and exces-
sive risk-taking by banks”.  With reference to $42 billion support
package for Brazil in 1998, for example, Barro asked: “How did the
Brazilians qualify for this support? They did so mostly by not exer-
cising sound ﬁscal policies.  If their policies had been better, they
would not be in their current difﬁculties and would not qualify for
IMF money”.  After further discussion of the bailouts for Mexico
and Russia, he concluded: “The IMF might consider changing its
name to the IMH– the Institute for Moral Hazard”.
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Typically, debtor’s moral hazard has been considered in a sepa-
rate strand of the literature which focuses on the use of punishment
strategies in models of repeated interaction.  In Bulow and Rogoff
(1989a), for example, trade sanctions are the punishment mecha-
nism to prevent strategic default.  But since their bargaining model
assumes a single creditor lending to a single debtor, creditor coor-
dination problems are not discussed.  Nor are they addressed in
Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a repeated game model to
study how restricting access to capital markets can check moral
hazard.
A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolu-
tion needs to combine creditor co-ordination and debtor incentives
in a consistent framework.  The details of such a framework are
provided in Ghosal and Miller (2003).  They may be summarised
brieﬂy as follows.
Consider a canonical two-player game of creditor coordination
where neither creditor can make a credible commitment not to
quit where there is a default, even when shocks are temporary.
Given default, this coordination game has three Nash equilibria.
One in which creditors simply rollover lending (stay, stay); a sec-
ond in which both creditors pull out (quit, quit), and a third in
which they randomise between staying and quitting in a way
which is determined by the payoffs of the game.  Which of these
will be chosen? Assume the best outcome will be selected which
is consistent with maintaining debtor’s incentives to service its
debts.   If guaranteed rollovers (stay, stay) undermine debtor’s
incentives, this leaves the choice between randomised quitting or
quitting for sure.  Whichever of these is selected, however, it is in
general true that there is excess quitting.  (The reason for this is
that the paremeters which determines randomised quitting are
independent of the debtor’s incentives.) So the termination proba-
bility is higher than necessary for incentive purposes and there are
too many crises.
Our analysis implies that guaranteed bail-outs will not solve the
underlying causes of a sovereign debt crises; and that the market
equilibrium needed to provide the right incentives is excessively
prone to ﬁnancial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in capital ﬂows).  How
can bond markets be made more efﬁcient? This is considered in
Section 3 but ﬁrst we look at the implications of our framework for
sovereign spreads and for unregulated ﬁnancial liberalisation.
Polit_07Part2_Chap2  Page 72  Jeudi, 18. septembre 2003  8:23 0873
Implications for Sovereign Spreads
As discussed in Section 2.1 above, emerging market sovereign
spreads over US  Treasuries responded sharply to the Russian
default.  From a level of between 400 and 500 basis points earlier in
1998, they peaked at over 1600 after the Russian default in August
and then fell to somewhere between 700 and 800 in 2000.  In 2001,
Argentine debt suffered spreads of  2000 basis points and above, as
did Brazilian debt in the summer of 2002.  (After leaving the cur-
rency peg, Argentina has recorded even higher spreads of around
7000 basis points.) Ghosal and Miller (2003) show how their
framework might be calibrated to ﬁt recent data, using illustrative
parameteres so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary over a
range running from 300 to 7000 bps, depending on which of the
equilibriua is selected.
There are those who argue that the doubling of sovereign spreads
seen in Brazil in 2002 is largely due to contagion from the Argen-
tine crisis.  The framework discussed here could also be used to
look at contagion.  Masson (1999, p. 267), for instance, argues that
“pure contagion involves changes in expectations that is not related
to country’s macroeconomic fundamentals” and suggests that “by
analogy to the literature on bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983), attacks on countries which involve a simultaneous move
from a non-run to a run equilibrium seem to be relevant for recent
experience in emerging market countries.” To include contagion on
this deﬁnition, we need only relax the assumption that the market
selects the most efﬁcient incentive compatible equilibrium between
creditors: a move from a mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure
strategy of quitting unconnected with any change in fundamentals
would count as contagion on Masson’s deﬁnition; and, as numerical
calibration indicates, could double sovereign spreads.
Possible Perverse Effects 
of un-Regulated Financial Liberalisation
Financial liberalisation in the absence of appropriate regulation
can increase the risk of ﬁnancial crisis (Goldstein, 1997; Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1999).  It may, for example, make it easier to ship
money out of the country to evade taxes.1  But what if liberalisation
also cuts the cost of exit in the co-ordination game? (A fall in legal
costs makes quitting more attractive: so, in the mixed strategy equi-
librium, the probability of staying must be increased to balance the
Polit_07Part2_Chap2  Page 73  Jeudi, 18. septembre 2003  8:23 0874
expected pay-offs of quitting and staying –and this increases the
continuation probability of the game.) The new mixed strategy
equilibrium could then fall afoul of the no-shirking constraint:
hence, in the face of default for any reason, only the threat of cer-
tain withdrawal will be sufﬁcient to check debtor’s moral hazard.
The results could be dramatic: our calibrations suggest that it could
raise the sovereign spread from 800 to 2000 bps.
Is this more than a theoretical curiosum? As Tobin (1999, p. 73)
notes: “In the ‘bailout’ packages for East Asian economies, further
cross-border ﬁnancial liberalization was one of the conditions
imposed by the IMF and the US Treasury for ofﬁcial loans.  This was
a surprising requirement, given the evident facts that excessive pri-
vate external short-term debt was, if not a cause of the crisis, a seri-
ous aggravation of it, and that banking and ﬁnancial institutions
seemed to need more regulations in several respects as well as
fewer in other respects.” Pressure to increase competition in ﬁnan-
cial markets may also be counterproductive in the absence of
appropriate ﬁnancial regulation (Hellman et al., 2000).
SDRM and CACs
In this section, we consider a bankruptcy procedure involving
temporary stay on creditor litigation and discovery process for
determining the underlying causes of default.  A key element of the
procedure is that when the sovereign debtor in default is found to
have made little or no effort, its private payoffs will be reduced ex
post.  To provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mecha-
nism for doing this should have been agreed ex ante, as would be
true if a ruled-governed public agency is involved.  Moreover, we
argue that privately issued bond contracts are unlikely to achieve
the same result.
The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the bank-
ruptcy procedures advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) –though,
unlike the IMF’s  proposal, it is not restricted to cases of “insol-
1. “The very large measurement error in world current-account positions (a
deﬁcit larger than $100 billion for 1996), with recorded payments of capital
income being much greater than recorded receipts, gives credence to the sugges-
tion that a substantial portion of international capital movements is tax-avoiding in
motive.” (Cooper, 1998, p. 14).
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vency”.  We conclude, therefore, that the institutional approach to
sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the IMF is, in principle,
capable of increasing bond market efﬁciency.   What the rules
should be –and whether the IMF  as currently constituted is the
appropriate public agency to implement them– are policy issues
that remain to be discussed.  In related work, Tirole (2002) has
recently emphasised the “common agency problems” affecting sov-
ereign borrowing: the contracting externalities which may lead to
over-borrowing and excessive short-term debt, and the collective
action problems that prevent efﬁcient roll-over and restructuring.
Though our focus is somewhat different –we take both the amount
and maturity structure of sovereign debt as given– the analytical
approach we use has many features in common, including the
assumption that there are debtor payoffs which cannot be secured
by creditors (i.e. are not “contractible”) and the links that are estab-
lished between ex post resolution procedures and ex ante debtor
incentives.  Our institutional recommendation for increasing the
contractibility of the debtor payoffs is not unlike Tirole’s proposal
to increase the “pledgable income” of the sovereign debtor.  (Like
Tirole, we have focussed on the problems that can arise from con-
tracts which pose problems of creditor coordination.  For simplicity
we have assumed that creditors all share the same information: but
the information asymmetries stressed by Calvo would greatly
enrich the analysis.)
Finally, we extend the complete-information 2-creditor model
studied in the previous section to the case of n-creditors and asym-
metric information to study the impact of introducing collective
action clauses: and we show that introducing CACs always reduces
the probability of uncoordinated debt crisis.
Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures as a Commitment Device
In Section 2.1, we argued that, in the absence of institutional
innovation, there will be excessive disorderly default in equilib-
rium.  Could this be reduced by institutional change?
Where creditors can, in event of default, exercise some legal
claim over the assets of the sovereign state or its citizens, there is a
good case for a bankruptcy procedure.  This might involve the fol-
lowing elements.  Ex ante, the sovereign agrees to bargaining in
good faith after default, and to this end establishes some “contract-
ibility” on assets in favour of the creditors.  This might involve
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waiving sovereign immunity and agreeing that some foreign inter-
est payments and loans1 could be diverted in favour of creditors as
part of the bargaining process.  Note that this enhanced “contract-
ibility” must also have the effect of reducing private payoffs to the
sovereign; otherwise it will not have the desired incentive effects.
When a default occurs, however, the sovereign debtor is afforded
protection by a temporary stay on creditor litigation.  This legiti-
mises the suspension of payments and also prevents litigation (by
“vultures”) from inhibiting negotiations, Miller and Zhang (2000).
Furthermore, it provides a breathing space for a “discovery” pro-
cess where efforts are made to establish the underlying causes of
default (and to determine whether it was due to a bad shock or poor
effort).  If this reveals the debtor to have made appropriate effort
and to be suffering from an exogenous shock, bargaining would
involve debt restructuring –the lengthening of debt maturities for
temporary shock, and some write-down for a permanent shock
known to be outside the control of the debtor.  But if the debtor is
revealed to have made little or no effort to arrange its ﬁnancial and
ﬁscal affairs, then it will be penalised with payoffs changed ex post
in ways that have been agreed ex ante.  (It is to make this possible
that the debtor must have agreed to make some private payoffs con-
tractible.)
Along similar lines, Eaton (2002, p. 5) observes: “One role that
an international bankruptcy court could play is in clarifying the
extent of the sovereign’s malfeasance in a default, and applying
penalties appropriately.” He goes on to note that: “Tougher sanc-
tions in response to malfeasance that leads to default is ultimately
in the interest of sovereign countries, as it enhances their access to
credit.”
Before turning to the institutional implications, consider two
special cases.  First is where the reasons for default are known as
soon as it occurs, i.e without a discovery phase.  Here, there is no
need for an extended bankruptcy procedure.  If the default is due to
an exogenous shock, liquidity can be provided right away.  If the
default is due to lack of effort, then the debtor’s payoffs are changed
ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante.  This is perspective
1. Eaton (2002, p. 13) discusses the idea that “a portion of any loan be held in
escrow at the time that it is extended.  The escrow account would be turned over to
the sovereign as it repaid its loan according to schedule.  Upon declaration of a
standstill, however, funds would be paid instead to creditors.”
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taken by Olivier Jeanne (2001) who argues that “the institution that
brings the economy the closest to the ﬁrst-best is a ‘crisis insurance
fund’ that bails out all governments with a rollover crisis condi-
tional on the ﬁscal adjustment” (p.  19, italics in the original).
Under his proposed scheme, moral hazard is neutralized by denying
bailouts to countries that have not implemented the ﬁscal adjust-
ment.  Jeanne notes, however, the crisis fund would probably have
to be a rule-based public agency, ﬁrst because of “time to verify”1
and second because private insurance contract for sovereigns can-
not be made contingent on ﬁscal effort which is under their control.
At the other end of the spectrum is the special case where the dis-
covery phase is completely unrevealing, so the indeterminacy as to
the causes of default can never be resolved.  In these circumstances,
the contractibility over private beneﬁts cannot be exploited, and
“constructive ambiguity” appears to be the only solution, the
expected costs to creditors with reﬂected in sovereign spreads.
Institutional Implications
If ﬁnancing development by issuing bonds exposes emerging
markets to excessive crisis, one response is to limit the use of such
debt instruments, Rodrik (1998).  Some economists (e.g. Stiglitz,
1998; Williamson 1995, 1999) have discussed the use of explicit
inﬂow controls such as those used in Chile intended to change the
composition of ﬂows in favour of longer term investment rather
than hot money.2 As Cordella (1998) points out, inﬂow controls
which succeed in shifting the structure of external ﬁnancing may
increase rather than decrease the total volume of ﬁnance available
for development: “taxes on short-term capital ﬂows by avoiding
rational panics, can improve the expected returns of investments in
emerging markets, and thus increase the total volume of funds
entering the country” (p. 6).  In time of crisis, however, the use of
outﬂow controls may well be considered, both as a way of conserv-
ing scarce foreign currency and of lowering domestic interest rates,
Krugman (1998).
1. A private insurer would have strong incentives to renege the contract ex post
(by not lending in the event of bad news).  Even if one assumes that the private
insurer can be forced by a court to lend later, it would be too late” (Jeanne, 2001,
p. 21).
2. China attracts massive FDI inﬂows but strictly limits other forms of external
ﬁnance.
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The debate between John Taylor and Anne Krueger is, of course,
premised on the widespread continuation of bond ﬁnance for
emerging markets countries without sovereign immunity, as is our
own discussion of the bankruptcy procedure –where we see an
important role for a rule-governed public agency to supply a com-
mitment mechanism which makes private payoffs accessible to the
creditors ex post.  It may be that the required control over the ex
post behaviour of the debtor could be achieved by ofﬁcial “IMF con-
ditionality” which governs the actions of the sovereign whose debt
is being restructured.  (Applicants for debt restructuring in the Paris
Club are required as a matter of course to agree a programme with
the  IMF before negotiation with creditors begin.) Thus IMF pro-
grammes could play an important role in the international bank-
ruptcy procedure described above.1 To  check moral hazard, of
course, it would have to be known in advance that “conditionality”
would be used to achieve the contractibility of private payoffs, i.e.
the “rules” need to be clear.
As an alternative to an SDRM, Collective Action Clauses have the
attraction that they are voluntary and market driven.  As discussed
earlier, however, there are two problems of implementation, ﬁrst
the need to replace outstanding contracts, by swaps for example,
and second the need to aggregate across different instruments, pos-
sibly by two-stage debt swaps, see Table 1.  Even supposing both
can be solved, we believe that private bond contracts, which are
typically incomplete and involve creditors deciding what to do ex
post, are unable to deliver the required degree of protection and pre-
commitment.  Contracts incorporating Collective Action Clauses
do not prevent creditors from suing provided there is a blocking
minority in favour, Thomas (2002).   Moreover, contracts with
majority action action clauses may fail to be renegotiation proof
after a discovery phase in which the debtor is effort level is con-
ﬁrmed to be “bad”, as the debtor may renege on commitments to
1. How does this differ from what happens with IMF “bail-outs” where private
creditors who wish to exit can do so using emergency ofﬁcial funding and the IMF
can impose conditionality so as to secure repayment? (Jeanne and Zettlemeyer,
2000 provide evidence that ofﬁcial funding is almost always repaid.) If this is
known ex ante, is it not as if creditors can secure commitment from the debtor? Yes
but, given the possibility of exit, they do not have the appropriate incentives: there
is a problem of investor’s moral hazard where private creditors fail to monitor.
The bankruptcy procedures advocated by Anne Krueger explicitly prevent creditor
exit so as to avoid this problem.
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make ex post transfers.  In other words, a hold-up problem may
ensue as now the sovereign debtor has all the bargaining power.1
Anticipating this, even with majority action clauses, creditors may
choose to terminate the project.
Table 1. CACs and SDRM: Some key issues
An  SDRM  backed by an international organisation, acting on
behalf of the international community, can solve such a hold-up
problem by making the sovereign’s payoffs attachable ex post.  In
other words, our analysis of the reason for excessive crisis leads us
to choose an SDRM mechanism rather than private contracts.  The
implementation of the SDRM will, however, require a super-major-
ity vote to change the Articles in the IMF, something that United
States alone can block.  Even assuming that the Articles can be
changed, two delicate issues need to be considered: whose private
payoffs should be attached ex post; and to whom should responsi-
bility for overseeing such attachment be delegated? Answering the
ﬁrst question involves issues of political economy which we dis-
cuss in Section 4 below.   As for the second question, Stiglitz
(2002b) argues that, being dominated by creditors’ interests and
having adopted the “free market mantra of 1980s”, the IMF is not
well suited to devise and implement strategies for remedying capi-
tal market failures.  In response to ﬁnancial crises in East Asia and
Latin America, however, the organisation has shown itself willing
to contemplate inﬂow controls and standstills as part of an SDRM.  It
is true that recommending outﬂow controls (and enforced capital
repatriation) would not be consistent with its normal practices and
procedures.
1. This situation arises in Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model of credit cycles
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Asymmetric Information, Creditor Coordination and CACs
The widespread adoption of Collective Action Clauses is far
more likely that the creation of a formal SDRM.  As reported above,
Mexico (and subsequently Brazil) have already issued sovereign
debt in NY containing Collective Action Clauses.  How will this
impact on creditor coordination? We begin by extending the two
creditor model discussed in Section 2 to the case with n creditors,
allowing for the possibility that creditors have asymmetric infor-
mation about future project net worth.  We then study a special
case of this model with three agents.  From the Bayesian equilibria
of this game we derive the probability of project termination with-
out collective action clauses and show that introducing collective
action clauses lowers the probability of uncoordinated sovereign
debt crisis.
Creditor coordination with asymmetric information.    Consider the
following variation of the n-creditor model in Ghosal and Miller
(2003) and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2003).  A sovereign is
embarking on a bond-ﬁnanced investment project, costing  ,
which lasts only 2 periods.  All ﬁnance is now supplied by n identi-
cal creditors each of whom has invested b.  Each creditor is prom-
ised a return of r in period 1 and (1 + r) in period 2.  So long as
resources available cover these payments, i.e. cash ﬂow in period 1
is great than nrb and cash ﬂow in period 2 is greater than (1 + r)nb,
the project will run to completion.  There is an unanticipated, exog-
enous temporary shock (bad luck) that lowers that sovereign’s
capacity to pay in the ﬁrst period the amount that is due to the bond-
holders under their contract.  The failure to comply with the terms
of the debt contract constitutes default.  However, conditional on
default, it is common knowledge that the project net worth is P,
. We will assume that there is incomplete infor-
mation about P and creditors receive privately observed signals of
the true value of P.
Assume that acceleration requires a minimum of 25  %
of  creditors to act.  Label an individual creditor by i, i = 1, …, n.
Each creditor chooses an action  .   Let
 and   for an action proﬁle
.  Let N be the set of integers between   and n.
K′
0 P 1 r + () b   
ai Quit, Stay {} ∈
NaQ , ia i   Q   =  , {}   = NaS , ia i   S   =  , {}   =
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Consider function  :   such that
,  ,  , where   is




creditors accelerate their claims, project terminates.  The creditors
who accelerate when the others   do not, reckon to recover
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Consider  also  the function    :   such that
 where .    Here,  liquida-
tion (in asset grab race for a ﬁrm) allows the ﬁrst mover to exit with-
out much loss of value but liquidation is costly for other creditors.
   is residual payoff for the second mover in the asset grab
race.  Remark that   is well-deﬁned for all   as we
must have  ; otherwise, the sovereign debtor would
have enough resources to service her debt and would not default in
the ﬁrst place.
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The legal cost   reﬂects the fact that an individual creditor, who
unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, incurs a legal fee for
doing so but as the project is not terminated, obtains his continua-
tion payoff P, net of this cost.
Instead of working directly with these gross payoffs, for compu-
tational purposes, it is convenient to work with normalized payoffs
speciﬁed as follows.  Deﬁne the function g:   such that 
is decreasing in x,   for   and  .  Consider
function  l:   such that    is decreasing in x  and
  for all  .   Suppose a  is such that
.  Then,
if  , the payoff to creditor i is 
if  , the payoff to creditor i is 
Suppose a is such that  .  Then,
if  , the payoff to creditor i is 
if  , the payoff to creditor i is g
where .    j captures the fact that an individual creditor who
unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, pays a small but
strictly positive cost and therefore receives a continuation payoff of
g, net of this cost and   and  , where g  is the
continuation payoff if the debt is rolled over/creditor not accelerate
her claims and the project continues to the next period.  Let q(.)
denote the probability distribution over g.  Each creditor observes a
privately observed noisy signal   of g, where ,
where   and  .  Conditional on g, the signals are
independently and identically distributed over  
according to the distribution  , where  .
Remark that the strategy proﬁle where all creditors choose to
quit irrespective of their signal is a Bayesian equilibrium.  There
exist other Bayesian equilibrium in threshold strategies.  In what
follows, for simplicity, we restrict attention to the case with 3 cred-
itors.  Consider a threshold strategy where for some  ,
 such that for each creditor i;  , (i) if 
then creditor i stays (ii) if   then creditor i quits.
L′
NR → gx ()
gx () 0 > xn < gn () 0 =
NR → ln x – ()
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Bayesian Equilibria with three Creditors.    
 
To consider other Baye-





.  Then, from the perspective of this creditor, there are there are
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posterior distribution over states of the world is   with proba-




.  Hence, these   and
 are two true states of the world for the other two creditors.
Conditional on  ,
The other two creditors observe same signal   with
probability 
One creditor observes a signal   while the other creditor




.  This occurs with probability 
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Conditional on  ,
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  and the other creditor
observes a signal  .  This occurs with probability 
The other two creditors observe same signal   with
probability .
We  ﬁrst establish that creditors will use the Bayesian equilib-
rium.  To this end, suppose that threshold of creditor 1 is given by
.  Since in this context, we focus on only the symmetric threshold
strategies, the threshold of other two creditors are also given by  ,
at some Bayesian equilibrium.  Then,
Two other creditors quit with probability
One creditor quits and the other creditor stays, this occurs
with probability 
No creditors quit.  This occurs with probability 





If creditor    i    quits  , his payoff is 
, 
ge –
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If creditor i stays  , his payoff is
 
 
As   is the switching point (threshold), creditor i must be indif-
ferent between quitting and staying, i.e. solving for   which satis-
ﬁes the equation that payoff from staying equals to the payoff from
quitting.  This implies we must have that
Solving for   yields,
It follows that conditional on default the probability of project
termination is given by  .
The impact of collective action clauses.    What is the effect of
introducing collective action clauses in this set-up?
In the bonds issued by Mexico with collective action clauses,
three things change.  First, the percentage of creditors required to
accelerate the debt conditional on default increases.  Second, once
acceleration occurs, the percentage of creditors required to change
the ﬁnancial terms is lowered to 75% from 100%.  Third, the per-
centage of creditors required to change the non-ﬁnancial terms is
increased from 50% from 75%.
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25% of creditors to act.  The effect of introducing collective action








(.).  By doing so, we see that   falls.  As   is increas-
ing function of  , the probability of project termination falls as
well.
What happens when acceleration requires a minimum of 50% of
creditors to quit? In this case, the payoff structure of the creditor


















 is the number of creditors who accelerate the





























 is such that 













where  ;   and  .  By computation, it is
checked that the Bayesian equilibrium threshold is now given by
Note that as  ,   and  , and   and
again the probability of project termination falls.
We summarize the above discussion as the following result:
Result 1.  
 
Introducing collective action clauses always reduces
the probability of project termination
 
.
While this result involves three creditors, Ghosal and Thampan-
ishvong (2003) show that the conclusion goes through in the more




-creditors –and with debtor moral hazard.
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Political Economy Aspect of Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
the Case of Brazil
 
The source of the debtor’s incentive problems in the model stud-
ied in Section 2 lies in the “non-contractible” nature of the payoffs




. the latter gets beneﬁts which cannot be
appropriated by creditors in case of default.  What determines the
non-contractible payoffs of the government –and therefore the
probability of default– is often a matter of political economy.  In
what follows, we ﬁrst pose a number of key questions; and then
focus on a speciﬁc issue: “political contagion” in Latin-America.
 
Key Issues for Research
 
How representative are the government’s priorites of the prefer-
ences of its own citizens? What are the consequences of political
parties with different ideologies being elected? What happens if
creditors can anticipate the consequences of regime change? These
are some of the questions that need to be tackled: and on which we
would very much welcome suggestions.
Consider an issue that has prominent in the current Argentinean
crisis, namely that those responsible for managing the economy
have exited, leaving debt for others to pay.  In extreme cases, sover-
eign debtors may appeal to the principle of “odious debt” where a
state may justiﬁably repudiate obligations incurred by tyrants no
longer in power, Birdsall and Williamson (2002) and Kremer and
Jayachandran (2001).  (This may currently apply to Iraq which has
$100 billion of foreign debts incurred under the administration of
Saddam Hussein.) We assume that this does not apply in the case of
Argentina: but nevertheless it appears that rich and well-informed
citizens were able to take their capital out of the country, thus





residents have made enormous capital gains in local currency by
exporting dollars from the country –now in default for lack of dol-
lars to service its debt– should they not participate in the cost of
clearing up the ensuing chaos? Could the state not demand payment
 
1. Smalhout (2001) noted that “the net external interest burden is actually quite










tion, there may have been private capital ﬂight of $20 billion dollars in 2001 before
the collapse of the peso.
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of capital gains tax on the assets “marked to market”, for example;
or in extremis enforce repatriation in order to ensure the realisation
of capital gains (and a massive inﬂow of dollars)?
This question involves issues of legitimacy and fairness which
we do not tackle here.  Instead, motivated by recent events in Bra-
zil, we consider how a vote of no conﬁdence in the Left-wing can-
didate can threaten ﬁnancial crises and how the international




Contagion and Political Risk in Brazil
 
After the collapse of the Argentine Currency Board in late 2001,
capital ﬂows to Latin America dried up; and in Brazil, country risk
rose to over 20% in summer of 2002.  Being the dominant economy
of the region, operating with a ﬂoating exchange rate, inﬂation tar-
gets and an internationally respected governor, why, then, should
Brazil have suffered the same borrowing costs as pre-default
Argentina?
Some economists believe that the sudden increase in the sover-





, which triggered a shift of equilibrium in a multiple equilibria
context.  But, this cannot adequately explain why Brazilian spreads
went up in line with Mr. da Silva’s popularity.  We argue instead
that the contagion may operate through domestic politics in Brazil.
We suggest that there was “guilt by association” as the preceding
December 2001 default in Argentina on its sovereign debt obliga-
tions damaged the reputation of the Left-wing party in Brazil, trig-
gering exaggerated bond spreads before Lula’s election.
In their analysis of the pre-election term structure of future rates,
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) have noted that the risk spreads showed
a marked increase not at but after the election, speciﬁcally in Spring
2003 when the Left-wing party takes ofﬁce and would rise further
thereafter.  In actual fact, sovereign spreads have fallen steadily
since the election.  It is as if the markets have been willing to revise
their extreme views in the light of the observed behaviour of the
incoming administration: the appointments it has made and the




, for example.  In the
 
1. Section 4.2 summarises a recent paper, Marcus Miller, Kannika Thampanis-




Working Paper No. 113/03.
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paper referred to, we use a model of Bayesian learning to show how




 acting as lender of last resort
and as a pre-commitment device could lead to the restoration of
conﬁdence and a fall in post-election sovereign spreads.
 
Sovereign Spreads and Political Risk.    
 
Technically, the inﬂuence
of political factors on sovereign spreads can be analysed by empha-
sising differences of preference between two political parties: Left-
wing and Right-wing, competing for power along the line of Ale-
sina (1987).  Assume, as a polar example, that the Right-wing party
is always expected to honour its debts, while the opposing Left-
wing is always expected to default and restructure.  Then, in the run




 probability of each
party being elected to form the expected rate of default –with the
outcome of the election determining whether or not default actually
takes place.
Consequently, with a Right-wing party in power, but an election
looming, sovereign spreads will tend to move in line with opinion
polls, as in Brazil 2002 where spreads increased as Mr. da Silva’s
popularity soared.  As the polls swung in favour of Mr. da Silva,
sovereign spreads increased sharply: from around 7% in March
2002, to around 20% in September, as Lula moved from under 30%
to over 40% in the public opinion polls.
That the Left-wing party automatically repudiates its debts is an
extreme assumption.  Nevertheless, it may capture panic in ﬁnan-
cial markets, when there are exaggerated fears of an untried Left-
wing candidate.
 
Learning.    
 
Interestingly, in the months following the election of
Mr. da Silva as President, sovereign spreads on the country’s bonds
declined from a peak of 23% in the Fall of 2003 to around 13% in
January, 11% in March 2003 and around 8% in June 2003.  They
must fall further if Brazil is to be able to honour its debts in the
medium term; but there is evidence that markets are getting over
their initial panic at the prospect of a Left-wing administration.
To account for this decline in sovereign spreads after the elec-
tion, we appeal to a model of “learning”.  In the Alesina-style polit-
ical-economy model referred to above, it is assumed that policy
preferences of both parties are well known.  In fact, there was con-
siderable uncertainty about what Lula’s economic policies might
be.  Thus, the markets initially expect default with high probability
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but revise this down if no default takes place.  This learning process
conditional on observing no defaults cause the sovereign spreads to
continually subside much as has been observed.
The prediction of the political-economy approach, together with
learning, is that sovereign spreads will widen before the election as
the chances of a Left-wing party taking power increase; they will
increase momentarily as electoral uncertainty is resolved by a Left-
wing victory; but they will decline over time as (conditional on
observing no defaults) the markets learn to trust incoming govern-
ment.  But how can the government buy the time needed for learn-






How the IMF handles conﬁdence crises.    
 
The danger that high
risk spreads might trigger default by a Left-wing government when




 acting both as
a lender of last resort and as a pre-commitment device.  With the
supply of emergency funding to ﬁll the ﬁnancing gap: and, with an
appropriate Letter of Declaration to implement sound ﬁscal policy




together with the incoming Left-wing party can overcome the con-
ﬁdence crises.
 
Summary and Conclusion.    
 
In the summer of 2002, John William-
son examined Brazilian fundamentals and politics; concluded that
markets had panicked; and commended that the IMF for its policy
intervention.  In similar fashion, we interpret the Sudden Stop and
high sovereign spreads as reﬂecting the “political equilibrium” in a
context where the behaviour of the potential Left-wing president is
very uncertain contagion may arise as markets and masses unthink-
ingly transpose events from neighbouring Argentina to Brazil.  The
IMF, it seems, can –and did– play an important role in combating
this contagion.  Perceptions of radical repudiation may fade as can-
didates of all parties publicly promise to control ﬁscal deﬁcits and
abide by existing debt contracts, signing Letter of Declaration to
the IMF as a form of pre-commitment in exchange for a package of
immediate ﬁnancial support.  As models of learning suggest, prior
probabilities of a radical repudiation will be revised over time if
debts are honoured and repudiation resisted.  This has, we believe,
taken place in Brazil; and if continued, it offers the prospect of real
interest rates falling sufﬁciently to allow for continued growth with-
out default.
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Lula probably owes his ﬁnancial survival to orthodox IMF poli-
cies: how far this has compromised his own political agenda is an
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Marcus Miller’s chapter addresses a key issue in the debate on
the regulation of capital markets, asking which contingent rules
are optimal in order to achieve the best trade-off between alloca-
tive efﬁciency and ﬁnancial stability.  While at national level this
problem has been at the heart of central bank and regulatory
agency development since the nineteenth century, it still has to be
dealt with at international level.  Since the stability of globalised
markets is clearly an issue for all participating economies, this
raises a global issue.  The objective must be, to some extent, to
deﬁne this issue conceptually.   Is it a true international public
good, which should thus be produced by a speciﬁc, international or
even supra-national actor? Or do we only observe an aggregation
effect, or an externality jointly produced by decentralised, national
regulators –in which case their stronger co-ordination would
improve the workings of international markets?
The actual topic discussed within this complex question is the
restructuring of sovereign debt.  The main elements of the puz-
zle are not new.  Twenty years ago, the (mainly) Latin American
debt crisis was dealt with agonisingly, and in an extremely inad-
equate manner.  However, the rules of interactions for the main





simple, straightforward and quite resilient.  They did deliver the
long expected results after 1989: a large-scale reduction of sover-
eign debt, and the early return of debtor states to primary capital
markets.  A second dimension was thus added: bank credits were
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exchanged against tradable bonds –called Brady Bonds– which cre-
ated almost overnight a large liquid market for a whole new set of
debtors from “emerging” economies, that is, sovereign economies,
but also para-statals, banks, privatised utilities, private conglomer-
ates, etc.  The market which emerged therefore proved much larger
than anything experienced since the pre-World War I era.  It also
proved uniquely complex.   The structure of traded contracts
became extremely varied and, rather than being operated by a few
dozens international, well-known banks, markets became popu-
lated not only by a diverse and fragmented set of debtors, but also
by investors (banks, investment funds, insurance companies, etc.).
This introduces the problem with sovereign debt –which con-
cerns only a sub-section of globalised markets.  If a sovereign state
defaults on its international debt and drops out of the market, inves-
tors are confronted with the century-old problem of what to do next.
 Moreover, there are other problems: of how to co-ordinate with
other investors, with whom there are the same basic interests; of
how then to meet debtors and negotiate a reasonably fair way out of
the default; of what then happens if the sovereign state refuses to
negotiate in good faith; of what to do if some creditors do not agree,
for instance, with a debt reduction and call up the London or New
York courts in order to defend their initial contractual rights; of how
to avoid stalemate; and of whether globalised markets can resist the
repetition of such experiences, where an increasing number of
states remains for years in default? 
 
Miller’s Paper Deals With These Issues, Under Three Main Headings 
 
First, a game-theoretic model shows that sovereign debts are
exposed to self-fulﬁlling liquidity crises, of the Diamond and Dyb-
vig type, which may create an incentive for the debtor to default.
This should not be considered an irrational decision, taken by pan-
icky, incompetent, possibly corrupt governments: situations can
emerge where a default –or a moratorium, or capital controls–
becomes a rational answer to the crisis.  Hence, at least implicitly,
the policy issue is how to make these decisions as disruptive as pos-
sible, namely, how to design and integrate them into the legitimate
set of policy instruments to be relied upon by governments, without





The second model that Miller proposes aims to compare the efﬁ-
ciency of three of the principal approaches to sovereign defaults
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discussed over the past years.  The conclusions are clear: there is a










no or few contingent rules, is the worst option: it maximises the
risks of stalemate, which would cause the worst losses for the
debtor country as for the investors, while threatening the develop-
ment, if not the survival of globalised capital markets.  The second
worst (and second best) solution is the reliance upon a contingent




) which would be written into the




 basis.  Critically, investors would thus
adhere to a qualiﬁed majority clause which would state how the
rights of minority bondholders could be changed, without any out-
side intervention (for instance of the judicial type).  The risk that
the negotiation would constitute a “hold-up” by minority dissenters





 each contractual structure.  This leaves open the
question of co-ordination between bonds, differentiated by their
maturity, types of holders, legal origin, unit of account, etc.  This is




.  In a
nutshell, they are better than no rule at all, but the perimeter of col-
lective action, that is, the deﬁnition of the public good they aim to
produce, is still too narrow, leaving too much to be achieved by
improvisation and by opportunistic tactics.
The answer should therefore have a broader reach, should be















cessive variants, between November 2001 and April 2003.  In this
case, co-ordination between investors is eventually enforced by a
new “statutory” or “proto-judiciary” body, which would have the




 minority bondholders the decision taken by




 investors in the defaulting state’s debt,
whatever type of security they hold.  The risk of a strategic stale-
mate is thus fully and formally addressed, just as in the case of
bankruptcy procedure for a private business at national level.  The
counterpart to this remarkable capacity however is not trivial: pri-
vate contracts are broken up by a public actor –a serious matter in
any market economy– and this actor is supra-national, since it
should cover debt contracts issued in different countries.  Critically,
this new body should receive the capacity to block litigation by
minority investors, bypassing the national jurisdiction on which the
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contract initially depended.  In other words, states would not be the
ultimate guarantors of private contracts within their own jurisdic-
tion –a most important innovation.  




 main shareholders, and their possible consequences.  Appar-
ently the policy debate on sovereign is now closed – at least the
scope of possible directions is at least now much reduced, com-













may have won the day.  The second best/second worst option seems
actually to have come out on top after three countries –Mexico,




  into one bond issue each,




 had been standard practice in





, and especially from its ﬁnancial private sector.  So, appar-
ently, in the coming months or years, Wall Street may adopt the
City practice, which may become universal so that at least the
microeconomic structure of sovereign debt contacts will become
more homogenous.  
As Miller rightly underlines, this re-coordination is not yet
assured although the main uncertainty, for now, seems to be more




-based markets will have the capacity
to solve even the larger and more complex defaults –say of the
Argentine type.  But even the hard tests are confronted, the discus-









sheds light on at least four broader issues of “international ﬁnancial
architecture” : they are still there and will keep weighing on the
future of international capital markets, on crisis prevention and cri-
sis management.  
 










  was not just about collective action between bond




 option, it also





Most remarkably, it introduced the notion of a stay on capital move-
ment, to be decided by the country itself in an early version of the
proposal, and later as a joint decision with investors.   In other
words, the logic of an out-of-market, negotiated way out of the cri-
sis could have been extended by ﬁat to a large array of capital ﬂows,
if actors considered this the best way to control the liquidity crisis
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and preserve the potential for recovery.  In other words, if they con-
sidered that the common good called for an extension of the perim-
eter of negotiation, they could enforce it.  The beauty of proposal,
however, was that such a decision, which is now only a unilateral,
highly disruptive one, taken by the sovereign, would have been
endorsed by investors as well.  Indeed, the preparatory papers, pub-




all types of public
debt (bank credit, ofﬁcial Paris Club lending, domestic public debt)
and how their restructuring could be co-ordinated with that of
bonds.
A current key question, as regards future crisis management, is




recognition of capital controls or stays (although obviously
one of last resort).   Will it accept an agreement with a country













)  This discussion raises a wider problem, which goes to the
very core of the ﬁnancial architecture debate: can it be envisaged





 in a private contract? As recalled above, histori-
cally the regulation of domestic capital markets has very much









 ones.  In this
case, the experience of developed countries tells us that there is no
such thing as the absolute sanctity of contracts: there are well-
known situations where the liberty of contractors should be cur-
tailed, in order to preserve the common interest, for example with
an orderly adjustment of prices and quantities.  Here one can men-
tion the intervention by the supervisor into failing banks, the auto-
matic suspension of share trading in the case of an excessive fall in
prices or, of course, the case of a bankruptcy procedure.  However,
such interventions are always critical and, if mismanaged, they can
easily backﬁre and affect both the future workings of markets and
the credibility of public regulators.  The objective is thus to delin-
eate in advance the conditions under which there would be inter-
vention in markets, how these interventions would take place, and
the guarantees investors would receive of non-discrimination.
Post-war multilateralism assumed that such legal authority
should remain wholly within the realm of sovereign states, just as
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litigation on private contracts should remain under national juris-









granted such capacity: the latter has now received quasi-judicial
powers, but it only arbitrates conﬂicts between sovereign states, so
that it condemns or withholds policy (e.g.  tariff) decisions, not pri-




  has developed full-
ﬂedged judicial power, complemented more recently by anti-trust




, though, the scope of such new power
was clearly delineated, and in a rather narrow deﬁnition, it did rep-









would have entailed a dramatic step towards supra-national regula-
tion, national jurisdiction –especially that of New York and Great
Britain– has won the day.  With the further legitimising and rein-
forcement of a market-friendly, contractual approach to restructur-
ing, their authority over the settlement of debt conﬂicts has also
increased.  They will become key players in any future debt crisis.
Whereas common wisdom sees a need for global regulators and
enforcers as a bulwark of ﬁnancial globalisation, the trend here is to










tions is a remarkable example, but the role of private arbitrage, pos-
sibly working “in the shadow of the law”, is another.  Rather than
pointing towards a global super-state, or embryonic forms of such a




 of the late Middle
Ages: a set of commercial rules developed mostly by international
traders and bankers of the day, often on a self-enforced basis and





)  Obviously, such developments are called for by the rapid
growth of international markets, that is, the ever-growing volume of
internationally-traded private contracts.   These were, to some
extent, also widespread in the pre-1914 era.  The underlying issue,
however, is the degree to which the stability of global markets can
safely be based upon such rules and conﬂict-settlement methods.
Do they produce, on an aggregate basis, a reasonably consistent and
resilient infrastructure for international exchange? In case of a sys-
temic crisis, to what extent do (or should) they rely upon the last
resort guarantees provided by sovereign states or their institutions
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proposal, which came to be defended by the Fund as a “back-up”
framework.  Rather than working as a standard arena, it would have
incited investors and sovereigns to work-out their debt problems in
a more informal, rapid manner before calling for heavy-handed
intervention into contracts.
A last issue, still visible in the background, is more political, as
it raises issues of social legitimacy: are contractual, decentralised
regulations providing enough guarantees of fair treatment for the
weaker players of the game? We can think, for instance, of individ-
ual investors, such as the hundreds of thousands of Italian savers
caught in the Argentine default? Or of holders of local debt titles
and bank deposits? Or, more broadly, of countries with limited
leverage in Washington and New York? This is the old issue of clas-
sical political philosophy –as much as of economics.  The aggrega-
tion of decentralised contractual exchange, as of contract-based
arbitration, does not always offer a guarantee that the best social





 proposal, just as with bankruptcy procedures at national





ital markets, for the continued existence of the issues raised by the
Fund.  Under this or any other guise, they will inevitably pop up
again on the international scene, as long as global market will keep
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Enhancing the Co-operation Pilar 
of the Negotiations
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) has emphasised the co-operation aspects of
any trade relations, something that has gained importance in the
present negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement.




 –and, in particular, for its External Rela-
tions Directorate General– encompasses a very broad array of
issues, going beyond the strictly economic sphere.  Sustainability
of democratic regimes is one of them, considered to be a key area
and a background to other relationships and agreements.   Even
within the economic and trade context, the number of issues and
projects can easily be very high, as they can relate to manufactures,
services or agriculture, as well as investment and macroeconomic
questions, not to mention the closely related ﬁelds of education and
culture.  





tions committee, held in Brussels in October 2001, the Subgroup on
Economic Co-operation “agreed on joint draft texts in the ﬁelds of
Scientiﬁc and Technological Co-operation, Energy, Transport,
Telecommunications, Information Technology and Information
Society”, as reported in its Final Conclusions.  Agriculture and the
environment were also on the agenda.
All this makes a clear point in favour of devoting more attention
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context.  Moreover, as is well known, trade negotiations are pro-
gressively becoming the tip of an iceberg, comprising a complex
network of activities and instances which involve, complement and
make possible the actual trade ﬂows –a fact that also generates the
need for more co-operation among the future members/partners in
any eventual agreement.
It is impossible within the scope of the present chapter to cover
the variety of issues under the broad umbrella of trade and co-oper-
ation.  This report aims at shedding new light on, or stressing, a few





ment.  After a general outline of the trade and co-operation nexus





like to implement, we analyse, in separate sections, four sectoral
issues: phyto-sanitary and agricultural co-operation; foreign direct
investment; telecommunications and information technology; and
cultural co-operation (the trade-related aspects).
The four issues chosen have a number of implications.  The ﬁrst
and third perhaps do not need any intellectual justiﬁcation, their
importance being clearly evident.  Co-operation on investment has
progressively received attention, and involves multiple actions,
ranging from the set of “business facilitation practices” to speciﬁc
themes, such as the streamlining of legislation and protocols on
both sides, and the question of remittances, not to mention the cre-
ation of a level playing-ﬁeld regarding right of establishment,





cultural side has important connections with relevant trade aspects,
in particular the question of intellectual property rights, over and










In section 4 of the report we launch a new idea –a more strategic




 agenda: mechanisms for co-




, something that could
positively enhance a harmonious link between a regional integra-
tion agreement and the multilateral stance.
In section 5, a broader view is recast, introducing a few other
speciﬁc points where synergies may occur between the two sides.
The discussion contributes to a deeper analysis of the proposal,
framing it under different categories.  Of course, many other areas
remain outside it.  A key area relates to the well-known question of




  has enormous experience in this
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area, while Mercosur will soon be required to adopt a regional –as
opposed to a national– position on it.  The Agreement creates a
good opportunity to tackle the structural adjustment issue, and con-
nected ideas, under the co-operation heading.  This and all the pre-
vious ﬁndings form the conclusion of the report, in section 6.
 
General Analysis of the Trade and Co-operation Nexus 




’s Co-operation Agenda 
in the Bi-Regional Negotiations
 
A Theoretical Framework for Analysing Co-operation Efforts 
in Regional Integration
 
According to certain international relations theories, co-opera-
tion among nations is an outgrowth of individual desires, capacities





s), Devlin (2002) is perhaps the ﬁrst attempt to establish a log-
ical basis for analysing the co-operation dimension.  Drawing on
Sandler (1992), he sees regional integrations as an impure public
good, which co-operation beyond the trade sphere may help to
bring closer to a pure, non-exclusive (true) public good.  He intro-
duces the idea of the “trade and co-operation nexus” (T+C), involv-
ing systematic co-operation in both trade-related and non-trade
areas, and thoroughly analyses the intensity of the (T+C) in differ-










Economists have long tried to introduce the concept of public
good into discussion of the international political-economic sys-
tem.  Kindleberger (1973) used it to develop his version of hege-





 The idea of impure public goods is also not new,
and can be found, for instance, in the development of club theory by
Buchanan (1965) and others, in the mid 1960s.





when the good is consumed by one individ-
ual, another is not pre-empted from consuming it at the same time,
 
1. We are not going to touch on nor discuss the ideas of hegemonic theory
here.  Those interested in the subject –which is regaining attention, thanks to the
present world situation– can ﬁnd perceptive reviews in Gowa (1993) and Keohane
(1984).  
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preventing others from sharing in the beneﬁts of the good’s












s nowadays has greatly contributed to blurring the perception of
the above characteristics in a given agreement.  Indeed, the com-
plexity almost forces the main negotiators –diplomats, in many
countries– to look for help in specialised groups of society, or class
organisations directly concerned with the particular issue at stake,
naturally excluding large segments of the population who remain
unaware of, or do not understand, the potential beneﬁts that could










ily become empty, as many people do not know how to participate




can also be impaired,
due to the different time required for each beneﬁt to become reality
(see, for instance, Flôres (1996)).  This may trigger competition
among the interested and well-informed on the sequencing in
implementing the agreement’s measures.
When the ideal characteristics do not entirely apply, one has an
impure public good.   The arguments in the previous paragraph









 public goods.  Apparently, there are only two ways of min-
imising these effects, turning the regional integration into a “bet-
ter”, or less impure, public good.
The ﬁrst is a broader participation of civil society in the debates
on the agreement, in order (ideally) to include the whole population
in the process of tailoring the integration (public) good.  This has
been taking place in some ways, though sometimes the excessive
politicisation of the debate creates other problems, one being the
polarisation of arguments into marked ideological corners.





constructors is going to be how to open the debate to society’s vast
majority without allowing it to stall in a few yes-or-no emotional
positions.
The second is a comprehensive (T+C), that will engage other
groups beyond the negotiators and trade-related actors, increasing
 
1. See, for instance, Stiglitz (1988).  
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the awareness and understanding of the integration, while boosting
its purely trade aspects.  This may substantially enlarge the number
of people concerned with the integration, at the same time convey-
ing a different dimension of the process.  Alongside the inevitable
tit-for-tat of trade and market access negotiations, a sense of com-
mon goals and achievements may be created. 
Without being a panacea, co-operation does seem to be an




s.  Nevertheless, it shares a political
economy dimension with trade negotiations.  Clearly, the choice of
the favoured areas, and related projects, can also be viewed as the
outcome of interactions among domestic “co-operation lobbies”, or





joint acceptance of the co-operation agenda can, at least in princi-
ple, be seen in the light of a now external interaction of these forces.
 Without denying this view, we take it as a second-order consider-
ation, which might be useful in certain instances.  Fundamentally, it
does not invalidate the role outlined above for co-operation, in the
sense of enlarging the perception 
 
of and the involvement in the inte-
gration process. 
 










 seems to have long been aware of the powerful role of a
(T+C), having sometimes started solely with co-operation mea-





 Usually, once an agreement in the (T+C)
spirit is signed, the Commission issues a country (or group of coun-
tries) paper, detailing the co-operation initiatives and the budget for




 side.  Though in previous negotiations,
like those with Mexico, interim or partial agreements were signed








 principle, all dimensions
of the agreement being closed at the same time. 





ation efforts have not been free from criticism.  The ﬁrst relates to
the well-known “Brussels bureaucracy”, which has many times
slowed down considerably initiatives which had been received with
 
1. Depending on which political-economy-of-trade model the reader prefers.  
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great enthusiasm when ﬁrst proposed.   The second, a criticism
common to perhaps all co-operation projects, is that part of the




 ﬁrms and consultancies, co-operation almost





Finally, most co-operation programmes are over-ambitious, dealing
with too many areas/projects.  Devlin (2002) correctly, and cau-
tiously, states that co-operation projects should not be too numer-
ous, at the risk of a poor implementation of too many initiatives
producing a ﬁnal negligible impact.  The combined result of these




 co-operation is just rheto-
ric –a coherent and beautiful rhetoric, given its emphasis on demo-
cratic and human values– but not much more.
Few and well-focused projects seem the optimal starting point
for building a successful (T+C) nexus.  In this chapter we have been
faithful to this idea.  The ﬁve dimensions discussed in the next two
sections work in a perspective not too far from the (T+C) role out-
lined above, although more restricted.   They exploit two of the
important purposes of a (T+C): ﬁrst, as already mentioned, to facil-
itate and boost actual trade ﬂows; second, to help create
 
  an
enabling environment for more trade and economic relations
 
.  This




 co-operation measures in the
socio-political dimension –like building or strengthening demo-
cratic institutions, or poverty alleviation– are not discussed here.
This is also why, especially within the latter purpose, the discussion





has been introduced into the study.  As far as we know, this is an
innovation; nobody on the two sides seems to have thought of cre-









the simultaneous purposes of keeping a constructive dialogue going
and avoiding tit-for-tat measures that hinder trade and business
opportunities. 
The four co-operation areas we single out in section 3 may give
rise to both country and bloc co-operation initiatives, as will be
summarised later.  Nearly all of them share the side-effect of an
improvement of standards and quality in general, enhancing the
competitiveness of the economies involved.  Co-operation in dis-
pute settlement is clearly at a bloc, or regional, level and may pro-
vide an original way of improving relations between the two
common markets.
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Sector-Speciﬁc Co-operation and its Possible Impact 
Within a Trade and Development Framework
 
Phyto-sanitary Measures and Agriculture
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary




) opened the way to the protec-
tionist use of internal food safety regulations against competitive
foreign suppliers.  The Agreement was reasonably careful in relat-
ing, in its Annex A, international standards and recommendations
for food safety to those in the Codex Alimentarius Commission,
and, for animal health and zoonoses, to those of the International








devices –notably the anti-dumping code–, the agreement’s well-
intentioned articles soon acquired a double-edged meaning, being
used for bad as well as good purposes.  Moreover, all the proce-
dures involved in Annex C –Control, Inspection and Approval Pro-
cedures– can easily be performed faster or slower, according to the





 has a strict internal food safety policy – usually rigorously
applied to its domestic producers –, which makes easier and more
palatable protectionist use of the SPSM.  In Mercosur, Brazil, for
instance, has been very restrained in the use of the Agreement, the









 However, the Agreement may
cause problems if closer trade relations take place between the two
blocs.  In order to avoid this, we identify an important co-operation
line in all aspects related to meat and animal products in general.
Mercosur has enjoyed a reasonably good reputation in its meat




, which can still give it a competitive edge over
new entrants like Poland –that, were it not for being reasonably far




 requirements, could damage its market share.
However, problems have been marring this reputation.  The ﬁrst is
the serious epidemics that have attacked various Uruguayan herds.




traceability requirements for bovine meat.  Though these have not




 authorities have signalled
 




$1 million, and the complaint was




) Committee on Sanitary and
Phyto-Sanitary Measures.
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 market.  Co-operation in the deﬁnition and applica-
tion of the sanitary measures and, in the particular case of
traceability, 
 
in the proper checking and measurement techniques
 
, is
perhaps the best way to ease tensions on both sides and to pave the
way for a fuller and more open trade in agriculture between them.


















 have been seen as in opposition to each other, the
former being seen as open to transgenics and the latter as strongly




 The reality is more complex how-
















s.  Mercosur, as
a whole, would broadly be placed between these two poles, with




 approach –95% of its soya output
comes from transgenic seeds– and Brazil being nowadays one or








 has tough regula-
tions on labelling and traceability of products that, somewhere in the




s.  These regulations are due to
become stricter following new requirements to be issued by Novem-
ber 2003.  In the Brazilian case, transgenic soybeans are the major
target, given the country’s position as a main soya exporter and the
diversiﬁed use of this crop in other agricultural and animal produce.
At present, many issues are at stake, including the minimum per-
centage of transgenics that would make labelling mandatory.  This
is crucial because the lower the percentage level, the higher the costs
of labelling for the producer.  Given Mercosur’s intermediate posi-
tion on this hot topic, and the initial stage of regulatory and safety





s policy is an important area where the more convergence is
achieved, the higher the gains for both partners, either in their recip-






Investment and Related Issues
 




) is a recurrent theme in





ble and, in the past, relations have not been smooth in this ﬁeld, as
 
1. For those interested in acquiring more information on this theme, Chrispeels
and Sadava (2003), especially chapters 18 and 20, is a good modern reference.
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 has occasionally evolved into almost




 discussions involve different dimensions,
ranging from the relatively vague idea of a level playing ﬁeld to
speciﬁcs like remittances policies.   Nevertheless, the Mercosur









other developed nations in their international position regarding
foreign investment.  This common view could act as a starting point
for a scheme of fruitful co-operation.
The Colonia Protocol, dealing with investment rules for the Mer-
cosur common market, lies semi-abandoned, a vivid example of the





one faced with a fully harmonised situation, the two blocs could
develop a serious co-operation programme with the limited objec-




.  This would be a
wonderful incentive for Mercosur to press forward with its own set
of common rules, while both blocs would try to design basic crite-
ria applicable to all member countries. 
Advancing the proposal is not too difﬁcult, and could give rise to








 in Mercosur is mainly the




, Germany, France, Spain and Por-
tugal, the other actors –like the Netherlands or Sweden– having a









 is mainly located in Portugal and Spain.  A spe-
ciﬁc-to-general approach, in which rules and procedures would ﬁrst
be ﬁne-tuned with the main agents –in the light of the concrete ques-
tions currently at stake– and then submitted to the corresponding
general bodies, could bear interesting fruit within a short time hori-




 experience –in this case, more in its failures than in its
successes– would be of extreme value, creating an area of actual
interchange and effective building up of both common markets.
 




Telecommunications is a domain where deep interplay takes
place among not only the goods and services sectors but also the
connected rules, protocols and standards.  It is impossible to dis-
cuss trade in telecoms services without a view on the related impact
1. This sub-section draws partially on Viana (2003).  Those interested in acqui-
ring more information of the technical concepts and procedures mentioned here
should consult a speciﬁc (though not too technical) work like Horrocks and Scarr
(1994), for instance.
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on the telecoms and information technology equipment trade and
on the constraints imposed by speciﬁc standards and other global
technical deﬁnitions.  Moreover, it is the sector where regulation
has moved farthest, posing complex problems whose solution may
again considerably affect the goods and services trade, as well as
foreign direct investment in the sector.
The EU-Mercosur negotiations on telecommunications adopted
as a starting point the annex to the fourth GATS Protocol known as
the Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications Services.  This
was an important move since, at the WTO, while the EU adopted the
Reference Paper, Argentina is the only Mercosur country to have
done so.  Brazil, Mercosur’s biggest telecoms market, presented in
April 2001 a proposal on the adoption of the Reference Paper.
However, it met with opposition from Japan, China, the US and the
EU itself, particularly because of restrictions on foreign ownership
of telecom ﬁrms.  So, while convergence seems to be likely within
the EU-Mercosur agreement, at Geneva the impasse continues.
Two crucial areas stand out as key co-operation nexuses in this
context.  The ﬁrst is the migration from second (2G) to third gener-
ation (3G) of cellphone networks, a process highly dependent on
the structure and technology of the existing 2G network.  This is
because the basic universal standard for 3G technologies –the IMT-
2000 deﬁned by the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU)– is, as often happens, broad enough to accommodate different
speciﬁc technologies.  The new 3G environments, beyond permit-
ting the long-awaited global roaming facility, will achieve almost
total convergence among ﬁxed and mobile voice services, data and
image transmission, Internet and multimedia services.  This means
a prospectively huge enterprise in both blocs, especially in Merco-
sur where telecoms penetration lags behind the EU (see Table 1).
Co-operation here means serious business, with the possibility of
very signiﬁcant gains in the medium to long run.  The point of
departure is in the EU’s favour as establishment of the 2G network
has not yet been completed in Mercosur.  In Brazil, for instance, a
heated debate is taking place, as Vésper, the local representative of
the US ﬁrm Qualcomm, wants to extend an acquired right to exploit
cellphone services in the 1.8 GHz band to the 1.9 GHz band.  The
latter has in principle been assigned by the Brazilian regulator to
3G services, and use of it by Vésper would place the ﬁrm’s cell-
phone technology, the CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), at a
vantage point as regards the competing GSM  (Global Standard
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Mobile) technology for 3G migration.1 The whole affair is doubly
strategic because, ironically, half of the existing cell-phones net-
works are neither GSM nor CDMA, but rather use the phased-out
TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) technology and are in the
process of being replaced by the two competing standards.
Table 1. Telecoms penetration in Mercosur and the EU; 
a few indicators (2001) 
The GSM technology, present in 193 countries, is dominant in the
EU.  This actual example shows how co-operation in this area might
have signiﬁcant trade spillovers.   Moreover, even after having
decided how migration to the 3G environment will be carried out,
there remains scope for co-operation on the various stages of the
process.
The second area is digital TV, an innovation that, though nowa-
days less overemphasised as the technical revolution in multimedia
reception, will still have a profound impact on future developments
in information (and entertainment) transmission.   Again, though
the EU has already deﬁned its standard –the DBV (also adopted by
Australia, New Zealand, India and Singapore)– things have not yet
been settled in Mercosur.  Argentina has already opted for the com-
peting ATSC standard (adopted by Canada, South Korea, Taiwan
and the US).  If Brazil adopts the DBV, or a hybrid form, there will
be signiﬁcant motives for technical co-operation in this area.
A third issue, perhaps as relevant as the two previous ones, is
Internet access and penetration.  Both in Mercosur and in the EU,
there are clear signs that Internet trafﬁc will progressively dominate
1. It is, of course, completely outside our purpose –and entirely senseless– to
state a position or judgement on the issue.  Vésper claims that its decision is bac-
ked by Resolutions issued by ANATEL, the national telecoms regulator.
EU Mercosur
Telephonesa
    ﬁxed.................................... 55.4 17.7
    mobile................................. 72.4 13.9
Internet usersa......................... 31.4 3.9
Personal computersa............... 30.0 5.1
Households with TVb............. 147.0 47.6
a per 100 people ; b absolute number in millions
Source: International Telecommunications Union.
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telecommunications ﬂows.  This will have a great impact on the
structure of the equipment industry and the costs of the service pro-
viders.  To overcome or attenuate this impact, more peering-back-
bone connections, in which a peripheral internet user is directly
connected to an internet backbone (provided ﬂows on both sides of
the connection are approximately equal), will be needed.   No
Mercosur country has such a connection at present, which amounts
to higher internet costs for all its members, as backbones are
located either in the US or the EU.  Co-operation in order to imple-
ment such cost-reducing measures, as well as on the issues of taxa-
tion and the use of broadband connections, is clearly needed.
In the telecoms galaxy, there are many other areas where co-
operation makes sense.  Examples could include information gate-
way entry and utilisation rights; spectrum, numbering, naming and
addressing management; pricing and cost accounting policies; open
systems and networks interconnection, or customers and universal
service requirements.1 Given the purposes of this paper, however,
the three cases outlined above would seem to illustrate why tele-
coms qualify as a key co-operation area.  
Finally, it is worth reminding ourselves that, contrary to the US,
where telecoms (internal) deregulation dates at least from the
famous Modiﬁcation of Final Judgement by Judge Greene which
exploded ATT’s monopoly in 1982, the EU, like Mercosur, started
the process only recently, and currently faces problems which are
similar to those of Mercosur.  Co-operation, even in a broad way, on
the difﬁcult economic, technical and institutional questions which
lie in the fuzzy border separating the telecoms and competition reg-
ulators can make a lot of sense, as well as being fruitful for both
regions.
Culture
Culture and education are the most important areas of co-opera-
tion in assuring a long-term, stable and ever closer relationship
between two groups of nations.  The problems created by the suc-
cessive EU enlargements, since that following the Delors Initiative,
and the tragic way in which fragmentation has taken place in the
1. Many of these terms may sound rather technical to the reader: they are.  In a
digital technology environment, numbering –i.e., user identiﬁcation– for instance,
has become a crucial issue, raising speciﬁc and complex problems.  
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Balkans have attracted the attention of RIA researchers to the former
Austro-Hungarian Empire.  Though still a puzzle to some, there is
nowadays a certain consensus stating that only the addition of the
common threads –and the ensuing uniform and detailed, though
massive, administrative procedures, going many times down to dis-
trict level– forged by a particular branch of German culture, ﬂexible
enough to accommodate key Slav and Magyar inﬂuences, can
explain the incredible survival and unity, over its last few decades,
of a power already in shambles.1
Cultural links, and the galaxy of common (or similar) habits, pat-
terns, rules and attitudes derived from them, constitute a solid way
of bringing nations together.  No wonder there is the continuing
ﬁght between the US ﬁlm and entertainment industry and its EU
counterparts: much more than an economic issue is at stake.  At the
same time, an encompassing integration such as the EU desires with
Mercosur can only be achieved through the strengthening of cul-
tural and educational links.
It is in education, rather than in culture in general, that the EU co-
operation initiatives have perhaps been more successful.  In Merco-
sur, and in the whole of Latin America as well, out of the seven spe-
cial projects administered by the EuropeAid Co-operation Ofﬁce of
the  EU, two aim at the interchange of students, academic staff,
building up common research projects and the development of joint
degrees (see Table 2).  In other aspects of culture, particularly the
entertainment industry, co-operation is more limited, although, for
instance, in the movie sector, joint ventures between Mercosur and
EU groups (especially those in Latin countries) are signalling a
promising future.
To include here all possibilities of co-operation in this vast area
would be to make, on a smaller scale, the same mistake usually
made by global EU initiatives: too many projects, which are then
almost certainly candidates for inefﬁcient management.  As in agri-
culture or telecoms, we have a more targeted proposal.
1. The literature on the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire is enormous and,
of course, much of it has nothing to do with the issues in this chapter.  Classical,
and not very difﬁcult or massive, works like Blanning (1994) and Taylor (1948,
1954) can, however, be of value.  Conybeare and Sandler (1990) is also interesting,
and less distant from our theme. 
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Table 2. The main EU co-operation programmes in Latin America (2002) 
Irrespective of the existing projects –and welcome new ones–
co-operation funds within the framework of the agreement can be
directed at three objectives.  The ﬁrst would be to achieve a com-
mon deﬁnition of a cultural ﬁrm, which would enjoy speciﬁc privi-
leges in both regional spaces, being eligible for particular
concessions in the other bloc and, sometimes, identical working
and performing conditions.  The concessions would mean greater
ﬂexibility and ease in its mobility and activities throughout the two
blocs, while the identical conditions would open up the possibility
–at the discretion of the local sponsoring authorities, such as, for
instance, festival organisers– for the ﬁrm to enjoy the same grants,
facilities and liberties given to local ones.  This is a bold proposi-
tion which would demand further study, but undoubtedly represents
a step forward in closer cultural co-operation.  Eventually, both
sides could create a (modest) joint fund to support these ﬁrms’
travel and activities abroad. 
The second proposal is concerned with audiovisual services,
where inevitably there are individual identities on both sides of the
Atlantic and, in spite of a greater lack of capital on the Mercosur
side, the two blocs are in competition with each other.  Mercosur
ﬁlms are well received in the EU, and the same applies, in principle,
Programme Area – main purpose
AL-INVEST Investment – to encourage small and medium-sized 
EU and LA ﬁrms seeking co-operation
ALFA  Education – promotion of higher education
URBAL Urbanism – to establish direct and lasting links 
between EU and LA cities
ALURE Energy – to encourage an optimal and more rational 
use of energy
ATLAS Business – economic co-operation through a 
network of Chambers of Industry and Commerce
@LIS Information Technology – to promote the beneﬁts 
of IT and bridge the gap of the digital divide
Alβ an Education – reinforcement of the EU-LA co-
operation in higher education; training in the EU for 
LA professionals
Source: European Commission – DG External Relations.
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to those of the EU; however, both lack powerful distribution chan-
nels.  Outlets should not be restricted to the classical theatre or the
projection room; DVDs, videos and television –where Brazilian
soap-operas especially have a market still to explore– are very
important alternatives.  Again, it may be hard to believe that, given
the enormous and systematic pressure that the US industry puts on
Brussels for total liberalisation of this sector, the EU would be able
to make a special opening for Mercosur.  However, the point here is
not GATS-plus rules for Mercosur –a subject to be discussed in the
trade in services negotiations–, but co-operation between the two
sectors aiming at improving distribution channels and increasing
penetration in each other’s region.  Certainly, between a GATS com-
mitment and local regulations –for instance, regarding the hours per-
week allowed to non-EU soap-operas and ﬁlms on a regional TV
channel– there is room for manoeuvre; which, without damaging the
non-discrimination clause, can be used to the beneﬁt of the partners.
The third project relates to property rights.  The culture industry
is one of the main sectors where problems related to intellectual
property rights occur.  In this area, not only counterfeiting –of CDs,
DVDs and similar media– is an issue.  Due and rapid appropriation
of rights, in the multiple instances when they generate revenue in
the cultural world, is also problematic.  Co-operation would entail
a project to streamline procedures on both sides, so that rights and
royalties could be quickly collected and remitted, and at the same
time enforcement would receive special attention. 
Dispute Settlement Co-operation in the WTO
Annex 2 of the Uruguay Round, “Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”, represented a
major departure from the existing (GATT) mechanism to solve dis-
putes among contracting parties.  In particular, two entities, the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Appellate Body (AB), were
created within the WTO, with the sole purpose of administering the
rules and proceedings in the Understanding and, in the case of the
Appellate Body, functioning as a last resort (see, for instance,
Palmeter and Mavroidis (1999)). 
It is not the aim of this section to discuss the encompassing
impact of the “Understanding” and the pros and cons associated
with the increased weight of juridical content and procedures in the
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WTO mechanism for the settlement of disputes.  Sticking to the
undeniable facts, the ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the frequency of use of the
DSB and its panels surprised even the more optimistic defenders of
the “Understanding”.  Secondly, panels have up to now behaved in
a quite neutral way, it being fair to say that no evidence of bias in
favour of a particular member –especially the more powerful ones,
as some feared– can be produced.  It is within this context of a very
active DSB that our proposal is put forward.
From January 1997 to March 2001, out of all the panels con-
cluded at the DSB (or the AB) there were 14 involving the EU and at
least one Mercosur member.  In only two of these, did both blocs/
members ﬁgure as third parties; in the remaining twelve, at least
one Mercosur member or the EU ﬁgured either as complainant or
accused (see Table 3).   These panels covered a variety of WTO
agreements and, as is usual, it took about 12 to 18 months to reach
a ﬁnal decision.
The amount of time spent in reaching a decision and the uncer-
tainty as to whether the losing side will implement the conclusion are
serious shortcomings of resorting to the DSB.  If the decision is not
implemented, or even when it is immediately applied, the question
of sanctions is a further problem.  Even when enforcement is feasi-
ble, which is not always evident, sanctions frequently backﬁre, with
the winner also losing some of its trade welfare.  Moreover, espe-
cially in Mercosur countries where legal assistance on trade/WTO law
is not very well developed, individual exporters, when in trouble, do
not know which is the better option: to use the DSB at Geneva or to
appeal to the domestic commercial defence system, in a local court.
 Finally, as panels engage directly in the case, without the help of a
preliminary analysis of the juridical aspects of the problem, it is not
uncommon to ﬁnd them stalled in a controversial matter involving
different, conﬂicting international treaties or commitments.
Table 3. DSB (or AB) concluded panels where both the EU and at least one 
Mercosur member took part (January 1997 to March 2001) 
Number of cases
As complainant and accused.................................................... 3
As complainant, accused and third party................................. 1
As either complainant or accused and third party.................... 8
Both as third party.................................................................... 2
Total ......................................................................................... 14
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Considerable time and energy would be saved if, within a co-
operation framework, a previous consultation system for any poten-
tial dispute at the WTO were created.  The system would undertake
a preliminary analysis of the juridical foundations of the complaint,
trying to reach a friendly solution.  In this effort, both parties would
make an evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of engaging in a WTO
panel, as opposed to the gains made from a quick, internal (to both)
solution.  Advice on the best legal ways to conduct the case would
also be provided. 
Such co-operation requires the establishment of a permanent
group or committee responsible for the tasks outlined above, to be
consulted whenever a potential conﬂict arises.  The proposal then
encompasses the dispute settlement procedure discussed in the
ongoing negotiations.  This procedure relates only to disputes that
emerge within the framework of the agreement, while the co-oper-
ation envisages deals with all potential WTO cases, going beyond
those inside the agreement ﬂows.  Moreover, as Table 3 shows,
often one bloc is involved in the case, while the other enters only as
a third party.  The co-operation mechanism would also be a privi-
leged source of information, with the blocs exchanging views and
strategies even when only one of them constitutes a main party.
Finally, better guidance could be provided on choosing between
a domestic commercial defence case and a WTO panel.  This is a cru-
cial point where a great deal of misunderstanding exists.  Reciprocal
ignorance, on the part of EU exporters regarding the Mercosur mem-
bers’ defence systems and, by Mercosur, on the (voluminous and)
elaborate EU foreign trade legislation, accounts for a considerable
waste of time and resources in the solving of cases which do not nec-
essarily justify a panel, even though they may cause damage to
either the exporter or the domestic competitors.
Implementation of this is not difﬁcult, as the basic cell would be
the body created for the agreement, which –in the co-operation
project– would receive supplementary funds for performing its
enlarged activities.  We estimate a considerable gain in time from
such a co-operation mechanism. 
Application to the Present EU-Mercosur Negotiations
We have outlined in the previous sections a moderate portfolio of
co-operation initiatives.   The ﬁve dimensions brieﬂy discussed
make for a manageable, though still signiﬁcant, group.   In this
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section we move back to a global view in order to make a ﬁner
judgement of the proposal.  An initial point to be noted is that the
several ideas/projects can be classiﬁed according to different crite-
ria.  Table 4, which will guide the present analysis, shows that the
overall result is a high diversity of project types.
The ﬁrst criterion deals with the actors in the co-operation –is
it to be the nations, or individual economic agents and social
groups? As in many areas of trade relations, both can be true.  The
projects allow for varied forms of interaction; while, in a common
food safety policy regarding transgenics, as in a common statute
for cultural industries, governmental involvement will be pro-
found –though not exclusive–, in the telecoms projects individual
ﬁrms and providers will probably play a much more prominent role.
 This begs the question whether, in certain cases, one is really deal-
ing with co-operation, or with a fairly crude facilitation measure, that
will clearly beneﬁt a speciﬁc group of ﬁrms/providers on one or both
sides.  In other words, here the political economy dimension of co-
operation emerges.11 This distinction is sometimes hard to identify,
but we do not think it is a criterion for rejecting a co-operation effort.
Where to trace the dividing line depends on whether the co-oper-
ation project drastically limits or excludes other alternatives –as in
the case of a competing standard– or, on the contrary, on whether it
improves competition among alternatives, while help to qualify the
decision-making process.  Looking at the column “Restricts?” in
Table 4 we see that this possibility exists for ﬁve out of the ten
projects, and is more marked in two of them.  Such a situation is, to
a certain extent, inevitable when dealing with fundamental techni-
cal or juridical matters (all ﬁve projects are in this class).   Of
course, taking the blunt example of the 3G standard in telecommu-
nications, once the decision has been taken, there is no point in
blocking a co-operation initiative that will eventually contribute to
a better implementation of the choice already made.
In spite of their diversity in other dimensions, all the projects can
be viewed as trade-enhancing (column 4, Table 4), and therefore, as
economic co-operation.  This has a practical signiﬁcance because
economic co-operation, in contrast to either ﬁnancial and technical
or social and cultural, has not yet been concluded in the negotia-
tions and, if need be (and desired), all the proposals can be brought
under this umbrella.
1. See the comment at the end of section 2.1 (p. 109).
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Table 4.  The proposed projects classiﬁed into several dimensions 
Most projects have a truly regional perspective, as opposed to a
country basis.  This will demand greater cohesion from Mercosur
in designing consistent regional co-operation programmes.  As a
side-effect, co-operation will also help to deepen the integration,
this being the last classiﬁcatory dimension (“Needs homework?”).
 Perhaps the best example in this case is the investment protocol,
and the related harmonisation measures.
There are also synergies and inter-relationships between the ten
projects.  Though the telecom projects (4-6) bear a technical char-
acter, they can produce externalities for two of the cultural ones,
namely, 7 and 8.  Project 3 can have an impact on at least 4-9, the
latter also impacting on 3.  The dispute settlement co-operation in
project 10 could boost the beneﬁts accruing from all the other
projects.  As expected, due to their very speciﬁc character, the agri-
cultural proposals stand aside from the others.  Nevertheless, they






1. Sanitary &   
safety
States No Yes Regional Maybe 
(M)











4. 3G migration 1.  Firms, 
2.  States
No/may Yes National No
5. Digital TV 1.  Firms, 
2.  States
May Yes National No













  9. I.  property 
rights
States No Yes Regional No
10. Dispute 
settlement
States No Yes Regional Yes 
(M+EU)
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are important building blocks in the task of drawing together the EU
and Mercosur sectors.
Thus, the proposal passes through varied checks and seems to
touch on different areas that can be reached only through co-opera-
tion, making for a fairly representative agenda for achieving the
public good objective mentioned in section 2.1.
Closure
The co-operation initiatives outlined here could make for a
diversiﬁed and engaging agenda, ultimately broadening the percep-
tion and impact of the Agreement.  Classic areas of emphasis for
the EU, like political co-operation and strengthening of democratic
institutions, have been deliberately omitted.  However, other possi-
bilities still remain.  A key possibility relates to structural adjust-
ment.   The EU  has enormous experience in this area, while
Mercosur must soon take a regional –as opposed to a national–
stance on it.  
Before the Argentinian crisis, some authorities in Brazil raised
the idea of extending Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social (BNDES) services to a Mercosur-basis, at least
for selected sectors.  Though the proposal met with mixed reac-
tions within the country, it is slowly gaining wider support.  At the
same time, many policy-makers in Mercosur would like to see on
an EU-Mercosur co-operation agenda a huge “structural adjustment
project”, with possibly a percentage of funds coming from the
Brussels coffers.  Though the Agreement provides a good opportu-
nity for tackling the structural adjustment issue under the co-opera-
tion heading, we ﬁnd it completely far-fetched –in fact, a waste of
time and energy– to count on EU money for Mercosur structural
adjustment problems.   A superﬁcial analysis of the difﬁculties
caused by the shifts in the EU structural funds programme, from the
Iberian/Mediterranean members to the enlargement countries, and
of the increasing demands the latter continue to make, shows that
there is no room for an extra-territorial, Southern Cone initiative in
this ﬁeld.  Without doubt, Mercosur must face the regional funds
problem, but must tackle it with its own resources and creativity.
The above case offers a good example with which to close this
paper.  Indeed, two points are worth bearing in mind when analys-
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ing a (T+C) like the one proposed.  First, the co-operation agenda
should be clear, compact and as precise as possible.  Its projects can
(and should) be varied, touching different dimensions within the
regional space and sensitising agents at different levels.  But clarity
of objectives is mandatory, to allow for accountable country papers,
in which targets can be matched to efforts and costs.  Nevertheless,
a second point brings to mind that big issues outside the agenda
should not necessarily be avoided in a global, more general stance.
It would be foolish not to use the immense experience the EU has
had with structural adjustment questions when designing Merco-
sur’s measures in this ﬁeld.  But this can be done in a global co-
operative mood, without speciﬁc commitments.  If, by chance, a
clear project on the subject is identiﬁed, with mutual beneﬁts, then
nothing should prevent it from appearing on the next co-operation
agenda.
Renato G. FLÔRES Jr.
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The Flores chapter is very good and immediately captures the
role of Cooperation in trade and integration initiatives: a useful tool
to increase the “purity” –and hence social welfare– of public goods.
Regional integration and trade is a “regional” public good.
These agreements are “impure” public goods because beneﬁts (and
costs) are not necessarily shared equitably among partners and
within their respective societies.  Given the increasing importance
of trade in the determination of welfare during an era of globaliza-
tion, coupled the expanding coverage of modern trade agreements
to issues “behind borders” (domestic policy), there is an ever grow-
ing awareness of civil society about trade negotiations and interest
in inﬂuencing their direction and impact.
Given this situation, negotiators not only increasingly consult
their legislatures on trade strategies, but also parallel that with
direct dialogues with representatives of civil society.  Nevertheless,
it is the role of negotiators to mediate different interests and lobbies





regional public goods that are as pure as possible.
The need to purify regional public goods is related to social
equity –broadening the distributional impact–  but also has political
economy considerations.  In effect, “rivalness” and “excludability”
–elements of impure public goods– can set off intense opposition to
trade initiatives by marginalized groups.   It is well known that
“winners” are disperse in society while losers are concentrated.
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The latter therefore can more easily identify their interests and
coordinate positions.
A Trade and Cooperation (T&C) nexus can contribute to the
purity of regional public goods.  This is because Cooperation pro-
grams can advance collective social beneﬁts of an agreement before
closure of negotiations; can assist negotiators in their technical
capacity to negotiate and implement welfare-enhancing agreements
and can help to more equitably distribute the beneﬁts during the
transition to free trade.
(T&C) nexuses are especially helpful in North-South agree-
ments where developing country partners face asymmetric relations
in terms of capacity and impact.




) conceptually approaches this issue in




 creates a (T&C) nexus with
their partner as part of a three pillar single undertaking for free





’s calls Association Agreements.  This is in contrast to the
(T&C) nexus in the Western Hemisphere Summit Process which
has a loose and relatively uncoordinated link between T and
C. Flores correctly warns about the need to avoid a proliferation of
C initiatives that can create unmanageable dispersion and dilution
of attention and resources.  Indeed, he emphasizes the need to focus
on a few strategic areas with programs that have measurable out-
comes, benchmarks, and pre-programmed support resources.
In this spirit, Flores proposes a narrowly focused (T&C) nexus in





with the objective of (i) facilitating and boosting actual trade and
(ii) creating an enabling environment for better trade and economic
relations.
The focus on trade is appropriate.  While political vision is the
“mother” of integration, trade is its “father”.  Indeed, it is hard to




 Association Agreement mov-
ing forward without a serious core of free trade and trade-related
cooperation.
Flores chapter comes up with a number of proposals for trade-
related cooperation.  They presumably are meant to anticipate a
full-blown Association Agreement, which some hope to see emerge
in 2004.
There are a myriad of potential and helpful initiatives that could
be put into Flores’ tight cluster.  All the initiatives he cites are good
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ones.  But if I use some additional criteria for selection I can ques-
tion the convenience of at least a few of them.
I will interpret Flores intention as to promote Cooperation that is
designed to deliver beneﬁts of trade before a free trade area is actu-
ally negotiated and also serve to keep parties constructively
engaged in the production of trade-related public goods during the









) the programs should not









) should be relatively quickly agreed on, which
means avoiding thorny issues.
Based on these criteria some of Flores proposals may be ques-
tioned.  The entire area of investment is extremely sensitive and
clearly a touchy area of negotiations; maybe progress on Coopera-
tion would be slow, and if conﬂictive, even have negative spillover




s put Mercosur in the












 conﬂict and differences in policy in Mer-
cosur itself.  Perhaps Cooperating in this area is premature until




 and Mercosur works out
its differences.
Meanwhile, the telecoms Cooperation is certainly relevant, but I





 better deﬁnes its internal approach.  Until then efforts at
Cooperation may end up in confusion.  Culture is an excellent area,
but deﬁnition of a cultural ﬁrm is one component I would avoid





ations; so too intellectual property rights issues.  As to the “innova-
tive” proposal on dispute settlement cooperation, I would agree it is
innovative, helpful and “viable”.
But my major reservation about the proposals is that all of them
curiously enter most difﬁcult and sensitive topics.  On the whole I
would prefer Cooperation in less controversial areas where quick





 Customs Guide in paper and electronic form; while not very
exotic, it could help importers and exporters.  Cooperation to give




-Mercosur Business Forum’s Plan of Action for
Business Facilitation would also introduce trade-building measures
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In sum, the proposals for cooperation are imaginative, elegant,





movie distribution.  But more “plain vanilla” proposals might be
realized more quickly, generate trade beneﬁts, deliver a sense of
quick success and spill over to a more positive attitude for acceler-
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The Special Session discussions on Cluster 1 focused on the




presented, and were synthesised in
a debate on the conclusions reached and policy recommendations.
The ﬁrst theme involved the recent evolution of the discussion on
“international ﬁnancial architecture”, the emphasis being on the
analysis of some of the main proposals in circulation over the last
few years concerning the re-structuring of emerging country sover-





 as a result of “ﬁnancial globalisation” and its effects on the cap-
ital account of emerging economies, which some participants claim
adopted a “premature liberalization” in the 1980s and 1990s.  This
unstable situation encourages the formulation of proposals for deal-
ing with developing country debt, but these incentives have proved
insufﬁcient to achieve any consensus as regards new ways to man-
age the ﬁnancial crises of such economies.
The discussion also stressed the fact that ﬁnancial globalisation
paradoxically makes the local legal and institutional aspects more
relevant from the point of view of preserving global stability.  This
afﬁrmation should generate a tendency towards harmonising rules
and standards, but this process is hindered by the heterogeneity of
cultures and legal practices, as well as by the efforts of national
states to preserve their sovereignty.
Two models of ﬁnancial crisis management were discussed in
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The discussions pointed out that these models produce different
combinations of relationships between supra-national and
national regulatory instances, and that some developing countries
(including several in Latin America) display a certain resistance
to models based on supra-national regulatory instances, without
having made a proper assessment of the pros and cons of each
respective alternative.
The second theme focused on the issues of international politics
and security developed in the paper.  A ﬁrst area of debate involved
the concept of “new multilateralism”.  This new multilateralism is
characterised by its distance from some key concepts of traditional
multilateralism, namely, “sovereignism” and the absolute respect
for the rights of states.  It should also not be mistaken for multipo-









Seen in this way, new multilateralism produces a




power” is predominant.  Atten-
tion was drawn to the fact that the Mercosur countries –and South
America in general– resist any notion of multilateralism that is less
enthusiastic in its respect for national sovereignties.
 Those attending the debate agreed that promoting multilateral-
ism in a context strongly marked by the tendency to unipolarity
constitutes a vital challenge for the countries and groups of coun-
tries that invest in a world order based on the exercise of “soft
power”.





 regarding the Mercosur countries also came into the dis-
cussion.  In general terms, it was understood that the crisis between
the partners to the North entailed certain costs for Mercosur coun-
tries, having lost their already relatively fragile status of the “third
voice” in the Atlantic triangle.
The third theme of debate was how to treat the dimension of co-
operation –and above all trade-related co-operation– within the
Mercosur–European Union agreement.  The chapter suggested that
the dimension of cooperation would contribute to attributing to the
agreement the characteristic of a “public good”.  This served as the
starting point of the discussions and produced a series of debates.
This function of the dimension of co-operation was questioned
from two different angles.  The ﬁrst emphasises that the co-opera-
tion agenda is moulded by the same logic of political economy that
affects the other themes on the negotiations agenda, and accord-
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ingly does not constitute the proper mechanism for making a trade
agreement into a public good.  The second argument complements
the ﬁrst.  Its defends the position that the proper mechanism for
turning the agreement into a public good would be not so much to
include a chapter on co-operation as to establish institutionalised
channels of dialogue between the state and social groups, with a
view to negotiations.
Another sphere of discussion involved selecting priority areas
for a bi-regional agenda of co-operation.  It was emphasised that if
there were movements for this agenda to contribute to the trade
agreement as a public good, then the initiatives proposed should be
capable of producing positive externalities that are not “captured”
by speciﬁc commercial interests.  This question is particularly rele-
vant when co-operation involves deﬁning and establishing stan-
dards.  In this situation it can end up contributing to the production
of trade ﬂows which are exclusively appropriated by certain private
actors.
The fourth topic of discussion was the synthesis of the main con-
clusions and recommendations drawn from the special session.
There was convergence on the idea that the current models of crisis-
management, both in the ﬁeld of international politics and ﬁnance,
lack legitimacy, and at present are a source of instability and uncer-
tainty.  This realisation is not sufﬁcient –and here lies the paradox
of the present situation– to induce the consolidation of new para-
digms of risk and crisis administration on the international level.








– compete with one another, but all of them ﬁnd it dif-
ﬁcult to become hegemonic.  In the ﬁnancial ﬁeld, more daring pro-




 seem condemned to failure, at least in the
short-term, while some very cautious steps are being ventured with





Another aspect dwelt upon in discussing the conclusions was the





 the United States.  Such relations, besides being fundamental to
the two blocs from the economic and political point of view, have a
direct effect on intra-bloc cohesion in the two groups of countries.
For the Europeans, the author of the paper proposes a strategy of




, but the debate
did not specify what the equivalent of this strategy would be in the
case of Mercosur.
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 The discussions at the session dedicated to conclusions also
emphasised the need to go deeper into the theme of the emergence
of new paradigms of international treatment of the question of
development.  The debate on re-structuring the emerging country
sovereign debt is just one part of this issue.  It seems very important
to have a clearer view of the “implicit projects” which sustain com-
prehensive proposals in the dimensions of ﬁnance, trade, aid and
developing countries’ domestic policies.
One item that was consensually stressed in the ﬁnal discussions
has to do with the challenges that Mercosur will need to face in
order to adapt its agenda to the new international scenarios being
delineated.  In the opinion of some of the participants, the growing
relevance of political and security-related themes on the interna-
tional agenda, and the internal fragilities of Mercosur, together
exert pressure on the integration project.  Inability to respond to the
challenges of the newly-born century will not only compromise the
outcome of the trade negotiations in which Mercosur is involved,
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